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I. INTRODUCTION
In the little-noticed decision of New York v. Class,' the United
States Supreme Court has broken new ground in search and seizure
law and has handed to police broad and unprecedented powers that
will affect encounters between motorists and police officers. In a
straightforward manner, the Court held that a police officer may, "in
order to observe a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) generally
visible from outside an automobile, [enter] the passenger compart-
ment of a vehicle to move papers obscuring the VIN after its driver
has been stopped for a traffic violation and has exited the car." 2 As
a result of this intrusion, the officer in Class observed "the handle of
a gun protruding about one inch from underneath the driver's
seat."
3
I 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986). During the 1985-1986 Term, the number of fourth amend-
ment cases meriting full opinion by the Court were relatively few in comparison to prior
years. In addition to Class, the Court's other fourth amendment cases included: Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986)(holding the government's aerial
photography of a manufacturer's 2,000 acre plant complex without a warrant was not a
"search" under the fourth amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809
(1986) (holding the fourth amendment is not violated by a police officer's aerial observa-
tion, without a warrant, of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a private home);
New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (1986)(holding that "an application
for a warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the First
Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of probable cause used to
review warrant applications generally.").
2 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 962-63. The VIN is a set of digits which can be read "to reveal
not only the place of the automobile in the manufacturer's production run, but the
make, model, engine type and place of manufacture of the vehicle." Id. at 964.
3 Id. at 963.
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Although the Court conceded that the officer's intrusion was a
"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, a majority
found this action constitutionally reasonable under the circum-
stances. Writing for five justices, 4 Justice O'Connor explained that
the "search was sufficiently unintrusive to be constitutionally per-
missible in light of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the VIN and the fact that the officers observed respondent commit
two traffic violations." 5 Noting that it was "undisputed that the po-
lice officers had no reason to suspect respondent's car was stolen,
that it contained contraband, or that respondent had committed an
offense other than the traffic violations, ' 6 Justice Brennan, in dis-
sent, argued that the majority's analysis made "a mockery of the
Fourth Amendment." 7
The Class decision indicates that a majority of the Court is will-
ing, at least in the context of routine traffic stops, to grant police the
unfettered discretion to search a motorist's automobile where it is
necessary to expedite law enforcement and administrative functions,
even if the police lack any objective justification for such an intru-
sion. The concerns of this Article are three-fold. First, the result in
Class is not supported by any of the Court's precedents, and it can-
not be defended under traditional fourth amendment analysis. Sec-
ond, the Class holding is at odds with the fourth amendment's
guarantee to prohibit arbitrary governmental invasions of privacy.
Third, the Class ruling reaffirms the willingness of the Court to fol-
low a constitutional formula that provides little guidance to police
officers operating in the field and exiguous substantive protection to
citizens who have been subject to unreasonable police intrusions.
II. OVERVIEW
The Class ruling cannot be justified under any of the prior rul-
ings of the Court.8 The Court was able to disregard its fourth
amendment doctrine only by discussing impertinent issues and ig-
noring the central question before it. Justice O'Connor over-
looked-or at least misstated-the relevant issue. According to
Justice O'Connor, the issue in Class was whether, "[i]n order to ob-
4 Justice O'Connor wrote the Court's opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquistjoined. Justice Powell also filed a brief concur-
ring opinion, which the ChiefJustice joined. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens, dissented. Justice White filed a separate dissenting opinion which
Justice Stevens joined.
5 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 968-69.
6 Id. at 963.
7 Id. at 972 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8 See infra notes 161-72, 234-98 and accompanying text.
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serve a [VIN] generally visible from outside an automobile, a police
officer may reach into the passenger compartment of a vehicle to
move papers obscuring the VIN after its driver has been stopped for
a traffic violation." 9 In finding such an intrusion permissible, the
Court rested its holding on the conclusion that Class held no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the VIN plate and the fact that the
police intrusion to discover the VIN was necessary because Class
had exited his vehicle. 10
The majority's presentation of the constitutional issue is ex-
tremely misleading. The conclusion that Class lacked a privacy in-
terest in the VIN is irrelevant to a sound resolution of the
constitutional question under review. Below, the New York Court
of Appeals had stated expressly that motorists have "no legitimate
expectation of privacy in locations in a car which are observable by
passersby."" That court never held and Class never argued that
simply examining the VIN from outside a vehicle was constitution-
ally impermissible. Instead, the New York court based its ruling that
Class' constitutional rights were violated on the fact that the police
intrusion-opening the door and entering the vehicle-exposed
hidden areas and was undertaken without any objective
justification.
12
By emphasizing the object of the police search-the discovery
of the VIN-Justice O'Connor avoided the constitutional issue de-
cided below, namely, whether a police search of a vehicle to deter-
mine the VIN, based solely on a stop for a traffic violation, violates
the fourth amendment. Justice O'Connor framed the issue in such a
way that the police search appeared very routine. This characteriza-
tion may explain the lack of notoriety surrounding the decision.
The Class ruling, however, involved much more than an ordinary
police practice. The police intrusion at issue was a search 13 that
lacked an objective justification. This point should have com-
manded the Court's attention from the start.
Moreover, the fact that Class chose to exit his car on his own
initiative is equally irrelevant to a logical resolution of the issue.
The Court's reference to this fact,14 as is its emphasis on Class' lack
of an expectation of privacy in the VIN, is another strawman. If the
9 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 962-63.
10 Id. at 966-68.
11 People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 494, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181,
183 (1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
12 Id. at 495, 472 N.E.2d at 1011-12, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183-84.
13 The Court recognized that the intrusion into Class' car constituted a "search"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 106 S. Ct. at 966.
14 Id. at 966-67.
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officer had examined the VIN from outside the car and had spotted
the weapon, Class would have had no constitutional claim. 15 Class
also could have had no constitutional objection if he had remained
in his car and moved the papers obscuring the VIN, and then the
officer had with seen the weapon in plain view. In the actual case,
however, an officer standing outside the vehicle could not have seen
the gun, even if he had had an unobstructed view of the VIN from
outside.
It is, furthermore, quite misleading for the Court to say that
"the objective at issue is an identification number"'16 or that the evi-
dence Class "sought to have suppressed was not the VIN, however,
but a gun."' 7 What Class sought was constitutional protection for
the interior space of his automobile-an area that was not visible
from outside of the vehicle and that could not have been visible
even if the VIN plate had been dearly conspicious to the officer.
The weaknesses of the Court's opinion in Class are apparent in light
of the Court's failure to address these contentions. Thus, the opin-
ion dramatizes the insight behind the late Judge Friendly's observa-
tion that Justice Frankfurter "often adjured us to attend well to the
question: 'On the question you ask depends the answer you
get.' "18
Another concern about the Class holding is that it undermines
the central purpose of the fourth amendment: the prohibition of
arbitrary and indiscriminate government invasions of constitution-
ally protected areas of privacy. Before Class, the Court had always
required some demonstration of objective criteria or justification
before sanctioning police searches in these areas of privacy.' 9 This
requirement is necessary to prevent standardless or purely discre-
tionary searches by officers operating in the field.
The reasoning of the Court in Class, however, permits an officer
to search for the VIN whenever a motorist is lawfully stopped for a
traffic violation. The majority opinion supports this result in its dis-
cussions of the importance of the VIN in the pervasive state regula-
tion of automobiles and the lack of a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the VIN plate itself.20 This reasoning has serious implica-
tions for fourth amendment freedoms. If an officer is entitled to
15 See Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1983)(plurality opinion); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
16 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 966.
17 Id.
18 H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 319 (1967); see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 69 (1950)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19 See infra notes 298-311 and accompanying text.
20 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 964-66.
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search for the VIN, he or she is also entitled to search for a driver's
license, a registration certificate or a license plate which may be lo-
cated somewhere inside of the vehicle. 2' Each of these items, like
the VIN, plays an important role in the state's pervasive regulation
of automobiles. Motorists are obligated to produce them upon de-
mand during a valid police stop, and motorists possess no legitimate
expectation of privacy in these items. If a motorist, after a police
request for one of these items, is unable to produce the requested
document, then, under the reasoning in Class, an officer is entitled
to enter the vehicle to secure the documents. Furthermore, under
the Class theory, an officer need not possess any objective criteria to
justify his or her entry into the vehicle. As will be discussed below,
granting police this amount of authority to search stopped vehicles
raises serious concerns for constitutional liberties.
Finally, the result in Class signifies a continued willingness of
the Court to uphold police intrusions, especially in the automobile
setting and in the investigative search or detention contexts. The
Class formula provides no guidance to police officers or lower courts
and effectively weakens protection against unreasonable police inva-
sions. 22 The Burger Court, in the last few years, has undertaken a
sustained effort to dilute the fourth amendment's substantive pro-
tection 23 and has justified its handiwork in the name of efficient law
enforcement or police safety. 24 The clearest examples of the
Court's rollback of fourth amendment freedoms have occurred in
cases, like Class, that involve police investigative activities. 25
Investigative activity cases, as opposed to search or arrest situa-
21 See infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 371-426 and accompanying text.
23 See Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AMER. GRIM. L. REV.
257 (1984); Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 335
(1978); see also Lafave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 291 (1986); Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police
Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 551, 594-614 (1984).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1983)(A generalized interest
in law enforcement is sufficient to justify an intrusion on an individual's fourth amend-
ment interests even in the absence of probable cause. "The test is whether those inter-
ests are sufficiently 'substantial,' not whether they are independent of the interests in
investigating crimes effectively and apprehending suspects."); Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 701-02 (1981)(police interests in preventing flight, minimizing the risk of
harm to the officers, and the orderly completion of a search, justified detaining the occu-
pant of a home while the police searched the premises). Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675, 685 (1985)(rejecting the imposition of rigid time limitations on the scope of
investigative detentions; "[the Court has] emphasized the need to consider the law en-
forcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to
effectuate those purposes.").
25 See Wasserstrom, supra note 23, at 355-74; Mertens, supra note 23, at 597-614. See
also infra notes 371-426 and accompanying text.
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tions, require the Court to balance the interests and need for police
searches or seizures against the interests of the individual to be free
from unreasonable police invasions. According to the landmark
case of Terry v. Ohio,26 an essential element in this balancing equa-
tion is whether the police intrusion was justified at its inception. An
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, objec-
tive causes or criteria that support the intrusion; hunches or unsub-
stantiated suspicions are not enough.
27
The Class decision, however, illustrates the Court's new reason-
ing with respect to investigative intrusions. Under the traditional
Terry test, the police search in Class would not have been sanctioned
because there was no objective justification warranting the intru-
sion. As will be argued below, the Class Court effectively dodges this
issue by distorting the facts and utilizing its new formula to uphold
the search involved.
III. THE FACTS
On the afternoon of May 11, 1981, New York City Police Of-
ficers Lawrence Meyer and William McNamee, who were on routine
patrol in the Bronx, observed Benigo Class driving a 1972 Dodge
Charger with a "shattered" windshield 10 miles over the speed
limit.28 Driving with a broken windshield and speeding are traffic
violations in New York29 and can subject a motorist to arrest.30 The
officers turned on the siren in their unmarked vehicle and ordered
Class to pull over. After complying with this order, Class emerged
from his vehicle and approached Officer Meyer because he thought
26 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27 Id. at 19-22.
28 In its briefs to the Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals, the state
explained that the officers' observation of Class' "shattered" windshield "aroused their
suspicions." Respondent's Brief at 3, People v. Class, 97 A.D.2d 741, 468 N.Y.S.2d 892
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 63 N.Y.2d 491,472 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1984),
rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's Brief in Appellate Divi-
sion]; Respondent's Brief at 2, People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 483
N.Y.S.2d 181 (1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's
Brief in Court of Appeals]. Beside the fact that driving with a broken windshield is a
traffic violation in New York, N.Y. VEH. & TRaF. LAw § 375(22) (McKinney 1984), why
the officers' suspicions were aroused after observing a motorist driving with a "shat-
tered" windshield is inexplicable from the record. Indeed, anyone who is the least bit
familiar with the Bronx would not be surprised to see moving vehicles with cracked
windshields, missing taillights, exposed engines and any number of other assorted items
in disrepair without becoming suspicious that the drivers of those vehicles are engaged
in criminal conduct.
29 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 375(22), 1180(d) (McKinney 1984).




it was the "logical thing to do."3 1 Class gave Officer Meyer the vehi-
cle's registration certificate and proof of insurance.3 2 Because he
was unlicensed, however, Class did not provide the officer with a
driver's license.33
Officer McNamee, without examining the documents provided
by Class and unaware of his status as an unlicensed driver, went di-
rectly to Class' vehicle to inspect the VIN.3 4 Officer McNamee first
opened the door of the driver side because the VIN is often located
on the door jamb of older vehicles; he did not, however, find the
VIN there. Officer McNamee, while still outside of the vehicle, then
proceeded to the left-hand corner of the front windshield. In post-
1969 model vehicles, the VIN is normally located on the dashboard
and is visible to a person standing outside the vehicle.3 5 Officer Mc-
Namee, however, was unable to see the dashboard-mounted VIN
because some paper obstructed the VIN plate.3 6 At this point, while
still standing outside of the automobile and looking through the
windshield, Officer McNamee could not see the gun he would soon
discover when he entered the car.
3 7
Office McNamee entered Class' car to remove the paper that
was obstructing his view of the VIN plate. Once inside,38 Officer
31 Respondent's Brief in Appellate Division at 4.
32 The Charger which Class was driving was actually owned by Class' brother-in-law.
Brief for the Petitioner at 2, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
33 Driving without a license in New York is a traffic infraction which can subject the
motorist to arrest. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 509 (McKinney 1984); N.Y. CRIM. PRO.
LAW § 140.10(2) (McKinney 1984).
34 The public VIN is normally located on the dashboard adjacent to the left wind-
shield pillar or on the door jamb of the driver's door. The last six digits of the VIN
"constitute the serial number of the car, known as the true vehicle identification number
(TVIN). The TVIN is also stamped ... in a number of locations, for instance just behind
the radiator and on the rear axle." United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 645 (5th Cir.
1970); see also 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.5(d) at.453 (2d ed. 1987).
35 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 963.
36 Brief for Petitioner at 3, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
37 Id.; Brief for Respondent at 2, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
38 It is interesting to note the state's various factual descriptions of Officer Mc-
Namee's entrance into the car. In the Appellate Division, the state's brief read: "the
VIN number was not the only thing he [Officer McNamee] found when he poked his head
inside the car, because, while inadvertently looking down, he noticed the handle of a gun
protruding from under the driver's seat." Respondent's Brief in Appellate Division at 3
(emphasis added).
In the court of appeals, New York's highest court, the state's brief omitted the ear-
lier reference to McNamee having "poked his head inside the car" and stated simply that
"the VIN number was not the only thing he found when he looked at the dashboard, be-
cause, while inadvertently looking down he noticed the handle of a gun protruding from
under the driver's seat." Respondent's Brief in Court of Appeals at 3 (emphasis added).
In its petition for writ of certiorari, the state's "Statement of the Case" was taken
[Vol. 78
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McNamee observed the handle of a .22 caliber pistol which was pro-
truding from underneath the seat. The officer seized the gun,3 9 and
Class was arrested.40 Class also was issued summonses for driving
without a license and for driving a vehicle with a broken
windshield. 41
IV. THE STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
Class was charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree. 42 Class moved to suppress the gun, and Justice Wil-
liam Holland of the Bronx County Supreme Court denied the mo-
tion, finding that the search for the VIN was reasonable. Justice
Holland concluded that Officer McNamee's intrusion was "justified
'notwithstanding any lack of probable cause to believe the car had
been stolen,' because 'the defendant's conduct, that is, immediately
exiting the car and walking over to the police car, instead of waiting
in his automobile, coupled with the fact that the defendant did not
have a driver's license in his possession, made these officer's [sic]
from the opinion of the court of appeals. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York at 2-3, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986)
[hereinafter cited as Petition for Writ of Certiorari]. In its brief in the United States
Supreme Court, the state's description of Officer McNamee's action not only further
minimized the intrusiveness of his entry into the car, but also added a previously unas-
serted factual element regarding the gun's location-the claim that the gun's handle was
in plain view: "Reaching inside the vehicle to move the piece of paper, Officer Mc-
Namee saw not only the VIN, but the handle of a gun in plain view, protruding from
underneath the seat." Brief for Petitioner at 3, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960
(1986)(emphasis added).
The state had argued, in both the Appellate Division, Respondent's Brief in Appel-
late Division at 9, and the court of appeals, Respondent's Brief in Court of Appeals at
14, that the gun was in "plain view" prior to Officer McNamee's entry. This contention
was rejected by the court of appeals. 63 N.Y.2d at 495, 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483
N.Y.S.2d at 183 ("The government intrusion here, Officer McNamee's opening the door
and reaching inside, was undertaken to obtain information and it exposed these hidden
areas. It therefore constituted a search.") (emphasis added). The Supreme Court agreed
with the court of appeals that Officer McNamee's entry was a "search" within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment. 106 S. Ct. at 966; id. at 970 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39 Despite his earlier eagerness to discover the VIN "to ascertain whether the car was
stolen," Respondent's Brief in Appellate Division at 3, Officer McNamee never bothered
to copy down the VIN. The officers also did not conduct a radio check at the scene to
determine the validity of Class' documents. People v. Class, 97 A.D.2d 741, 741, 468
N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)(Carro, J.P., dissenting).
40 A search of Class' person uncovered some ammunition. People v. Class, 97
A.D.2d at 741, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Carro,J.P., dissenting).
41 Id., 468 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Carro, J.P., dissenting). The officers apparently reas-
sessed their earlier conclusions that Class had been speeding. Class testified at the sup-
pression hearing that he could not have been speeding because it was raining that day.
Respondent's Brief in Appellate Division at 4.
42 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1984).
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actions quite reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.' ",43
Class was convicted of the weapons charge and was sentenced to a
period of probation not to exceed five years.
44
On appeal, a four-justice majority of the Appellate Division af-
firmed the conviction without opinion. Justice Carro, in dissent,
stated that the trial court's reasoning "bends both logic and the
law." 4 5 Since the officers stopped Class on a sunny afternoon
46
while they were on routine patrol in a location not alleged to be a
high crime area, Justice Carro found the trial court's conclusion that
Class' actions constituted suspicious behavior preposterous. Justice
Carro stated:
The conclusion that defendant's act, of getting out of his car and going
to the officers rather than awaiting their approach, constituted suspi-
cious behavior, is absurd. I would do the same thing myself, if for no
other reason than the recent tragedies of officers being fired upon as
they approach stopped drivers might reasonably create an apprehen-
sion that would be dispelled by my exhibiting myself as clearly
unarmed.
47
Justice Carro found the trial court's second ground for uphold-
ing the search-Class' status as an unlicensed driver-"even more
illogical since, by the officer's own testimony, the search of the car
by one officer began before the other had yet discovered that de-
fendant was not a licensed driver." 48 Since the search was con-
ducted without any indication of impropriety and without a
preliminary radio run on the license plate, the police action, in Jus-
tice Carro's view, was no more than a wrongful trespass which was
not supported by the plain view doctrine. 49
The New York Court of Appeals, concluding that the police in-
trusion was without adequate objective justification, reversed. 50
43 People v. Class, 97 A.D.2d at 742, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Carro, J.P., dissenting).
44 Respondent's Brief in Appellate Division at 5.
45 97 A.D.2d 741, 742, 468 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (1983)(Carro,J.P., dissenting).
46 According to the state's briefs, Class testified that it was raining on the day in
question. Respondent's Brief in Appellate Division at 4, Respondent's Brief in Court of
Appeals at 4.
47 97 A.D.2d at 742, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Carro,J.P., dissenting).
48 Id., 468 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Carro, J.P., dissenting).
49 Under the plain view doctrine, police may seize an object where three require-
ments are satisfied. First, the police must lawfully be in a position to view a particular
area. Second, the discovery of the object must be inadvertent. Third, there must be
probable cause to associate the object with criminal activity. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S.Ct.
1149, 1152 (1987)(O'Connor, J., dissenting). But cf id. at 1155 (White, J., concur-
ring)(the "inadvertent discovery" prong has never been accepted by a judgment sup-
ported by a majority of the Court); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983)(plurality
opinion); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-68 (197 1)(plurality opinion).
50 People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1984), rev'd,
106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
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Writing for the court, Judge Kaye acknowledged that one does not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in locations of a vehicle
which are observable by passersby. 51 She noted, however, that
there are locations inside a car, including the area underneath the
seats, "which cannot be viewed from the outside and which an indi-
vidual legitimately expects will remain private." 52 Officer Mc-
Namee's intrusion was "undertaken to obtain information and it
exposed... hidden areas." 53 Consequently, his action constituted a
"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Judge Kaye argued that the lack of a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the VIN itself did not excuse or justify the challenged po-
lice intrusion. Citing Professor LaFave, she stated that "the exist-
ence of a VIN on every automobile cannot enable police, without
any basis, to make 'wholesale entries of cars on nothing more than a
hope that one of them might turn out to be stolen.' -54 The officers
had no objective justification for the intrusion prior to stopping
Class; and neither Class' exiting the vehicle nor his failure to pro-
duce a license provided a legitimate reason for a search.55 Accord-
ing to Judge Kaye, "a driver's emergence from a vehicle after being
stopped by police is not indicative of criminal activity." 56 Further-
more, a reasonable suspicion could not be based on Class' status as
an unlicensed driver because Officer McNamee "was not even aware
of that fact when he entered the automobile." 57 Judge Kaye ex-
pressly concluded that the record revealed "no reason for [Officer
McNamee] to suspect other criminal activity or to act to protect his
own safety. The sole predicate for the officer's action here was de-
fendant's commission of an ordinary traffic infraction, an offense
which, standing alone, did not justify the search."
5 8
51 Id. at 494, 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
52 Id. at 495, 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
53 Id., 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
54 Id., 472 N.E.2d at 1011-12, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 184 (quoting 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.5(d) at 360 (1978)).
55 63 N.Y.2d at 495-96, 472 N.E.2d at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
56 Id. at 496, 472 N.E.2d at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
57 Id., 472 N.E.2d at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
58 Id., 472 N.E.2d at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 184. The court of appeals also held that
§ 401(4) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law "provided no justification for [Officer Mc-
Namee's] entry of defendant's car." Id. at 497,472 N.E.2d at 1013, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
According to the court, § 401(4) merely affords police officers the authority "to demand
information necessary to identify" a stopped vehicle, including the VIN. Id. at 496, 472
N.E.2d at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 185 (emphasis in original). Thus, § 401(4) granted
Officer McNamee the authority to request exhibition of the VIN; it did not, however,
confer the authority to "ignor[e] this legislative direction" and intrude into Class' vehi-
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V. THE STATE'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
In its petition, New York urged the Court to grant certiorari to
decide:
Whether the New York Court of Appeals erroneously construed the
Fourth Amendment by holding that the actions of a police officer, who
had lawfully stopped defendant's automobile for a traffic infraction
and was attempting to routinely inspect the car's vehicle identification
number, ordinarily viewable through the windshield, by pushing aside
some papers on the dashboard which obstructed it, constituted an im-
permissible search of the vehicle.59
The state argued that the Court had never set forth the limits on
police authority to intrude into the interior of a vehicle during rou-
tine stops for traffic violations. The Court's previous cases dealing
with traffic stops60 and automobile searches, 61 according to the
state, "left open the question of what actions [an] officer could take
toward the vehicle itself.' ' 62 The state, reminding the Court that "ve-
hicle stops for traffic violations occur countless times each day,"
'63
argued that a resolution of the permissible limits of police authority
to enter into a vehicle during a routine traffic stop was "necessary to
cle without any objective justification. Id. at 497, 472 N.E.2d at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at
185.
Judge Jones, joined by judge Jason, dissented from the court's ruling on the fourth
amendment issue. The dissent argued that the probable cause normally required to
justify a police search into areas of protected privacy should be applicable to a VIN
inspection "only if the objective of the police action was search for proof with respect to
known or suspected preexisting criminal activity." Id. at 498, 472 N.E.2d at 1013-14,
483 N.Y.S.2d at 186 (Jones, J., dissenting). Where, however, the objective of the police
intrusion was merely the identification of a vehicle, the requirement of probable cause
has no application. Id., 472 N.E.2d at 1013-14, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 186 (Jones, J., dissent-
ing). According to Judge Jones, "there is no evidence" that the objective of Officer
McNamee's search for the VIN was a search for evidence of criminal activity or contra-
band; instead, the objective was "identification of the vehicle only, with no thought of con-
nection with known or suspected previous criminal activity." Id., 472 N.E.2d at 1014,
483 N.Y.S.2d at 186 (Jones, J., dissenting)(emphasis added). Apparently, the dissent
was unaware of the state's earlier statement that Officer McNamee's inspection of the
VIN was initiated "in order to ascertain whether [Class'] car was stolen." Respondent's
Brief in Appellate Division at 3.
After explaining the "compelling interest" of the police in identifying stopped vehi-
cles, 63 N.Y.2d at 498, 472 N.E.2d at 1013, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 186 (Jones, J., dissenting),
and characterizing Officer McNamee's intrusion as necessary only to obtain information,
the dissent did not find it troubling that Officer McNamee never bothered to copy down
the VIN number of Class' vehicle, even though this was the vital information which sup-
posedly justified the police intrusion in the first place.
59 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I.
60 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)(per curiam); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
61 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
62 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5 (emphasis added).
63 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
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clarify an important question of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
and, perhaps more important, to guide law enforcement officials in
the performance of their duty." 64
The petition of the state asserted further that, as a part of the
police officer's "inspection process," it was necessary for the police
to view the VIN in order to verify information obtained from a mo-
torist's driver's license and registration documents. This process, in
the state's view, should not be considered a search within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment because "its purpose is not the recov-
ery of evidence, but rather, the mere inspection of a public
document located in the most public, accessible areas of the vehi-
cle." 65 This type of intrusion, the state argued, was de minimis in
light of the fact that a motorist has already been lawfully stopped,
and it did not amount to the type of invasion which the fourth
amendment intended to restrict. Instead, this police process should
be deemed a "routine administrative inspection" 66 rather than a
search subject to constitutional scrutiny.
67
64 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6.
65 Id. at 7.
66 Id. at 8. The state's efforts to emphasize the "administrative" nature of the VIN
inspection, even when it necessitated a police intrusion into the interior of the vehicle,
could not have been lost on the Court in light of its citation to the "administrative"
search cases of Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Indeed, in sev-
eral places in its petition the state described the search by Officer McNamee as well as
similar intrusions to observe the VIN as quick and routine administrative inspections.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8.
67 The state also informed the Court that, although there was a split among the fed-
eral circuits and state supreme courts, a majority of the lower courts had held that "the
opening of a door or engine hood for purposes of a VIN inspection does not constitute a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is permissible within the con-
text of a routine traffic stop." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-9 (citations omitted);
see Brief for Petitioner at 16-18, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986)(a majority of
federal and state appellate courts have concluded that VIN inspections, even those in-
volving an opening of the door or lifting of the hood, are not "searches" within meaning
of the fourth amendment).
The state's contention was disputed by Class. He noted that in a number of the
lower court cases relied upon by the state where it was found that the police conduct was
not a search, those courts "nevertheless considered whether the police officer had a
'legitimate' or 'reasonable' basis to examine the VIN." Brief for Respondent at 20 n.9,
New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986) (citations omitted). Those decisions, according
to Class, implicitly supported the view that the fourth amendment is applicable to VIN
inspections. Indeed, Class asserted there are very few cases "involving intrusive VIN in-
spections which employ no Fourth Amendment criteria to determine whether the police
procedure was permissible .... Id. (emphasis added).




VI. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Court divided its discussion of the fourth amendment is-
sue 68 presented in Class into two parts. 69 The first half of the opin-
ion discussed the VIN as a general tool in the regulation of
automobiles. Justice O'Connor found it proper to make the VIN a
part of the pervasive state regulation that surrounds automobiles.
She explained that the VIN assists various levels of government in
the identification and regulation of automobiles. For the federal
government, the VIN improves the "efficacy of recall campaigns"
and helps determine the risks of driving certain types of
automobiles. 70 At the state level, the VIN aides in the compensation
of those injured in automobile accidents, assists the health and
safety inspection process, and promotes the states' ability to deter
automobile theft.71 In light of these "laudable governmental pur-
poses," 72 Justice O'Connor concluded that the federal and state
governments were justified in making the VIN a "significant thread
in the web of regulation of the automobile" and in requiring it to be
placed in an area in plain view from outside the passenger
compartment.
73
Justice O'Connor also found that "the factors that generally di-
minish the reasonable expectation of privacy in automobiles are ap-
plicable a fortiori to the VIN." 74 She noted that because of its
physical characteristics, transportative function, and pervasive regu-
lation, the automobile has been traditionally viewed as possessing a
lesser degree of privacy than a private home.75 Justice O'Connor
explained that the same factors that lessened one's privacy in an au-
68 Prior to its discussion of the fourth amendment issues, the Court rejected Class'
assertion that the Court was without jurisdiction to hear the case because the ruling of
the court of appeals rested upon an adequate and independent state ground. 106 S. Ct.
at 964. Relying upon its earlier holding in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043
(1983), the majority found that the court of appeals' opinion lacked the necessary requi-
site "plain statement" that the opinion rests on state law. 106 S. Ct. at 964. Justice
Brennan's dissent agreed with this finding. Id. at 970 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
On remand, the New York Court of Appeals held that its earlier ruling had rested
upon an adequate and independent state ground: Officer McNamee's search violated
Article I, § 12 of the state constitution. 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444 (1986).
69 Justice O'Connor's examination of the fourth amendment issue is actually divided
into three subsections. For purposes of this Article, however, her resolution of the con-
stitutional question is divided into two sections.
70 106 S. Ct. at 964.
71 Id. at 964-65.
72 Id. at 965.
73 Id. at 964.
74 Id. at 966.
75 Id. at 965.
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tomobile applied to the VIN.76 The VIN, after all, played a vital role
in the pervasive regulation of the automobile, and manufacturers
were required by law to place the VIN in a location ordinarily visible
from outside of the automobile. Justice O'Connor concluded,
therefore, that a motorist possesses no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the VIN itself.77 Consequently, the mere viewing of the
VIN, or one that was "formerly obscured" as was the case in Class,
did not violate the fourth amendment.7
8
The second half of Justice O'Connor's opinion explained why,
under the balancing formula of Tery v. Ohio 79 and its progeny, the
police search of Class' car was constitutionally reasonable. First, the
Court acknowledged that a "car's interior as a whole" 80 is subject to
some degree of fourth amendment protection. The Court also
agreed with the conclusion of the New York Court of Appeals that
Officer McNamee's intrusion constituted a "search" within the
76 Id. at 966.
77 Id. It should be noted here that the Court's findings that it was proper for the
government to require that the VIN be placed in plain view in all vehicles and that a
motorist has no expectation of privacy in the VIN itself are peripheral to the immediate
fourth amendment issue decided by the court of appeals, namely, whether Officer Mc-
Namee's intrusion into and observations of the interior of Class' vehicle constituted an
unconstitutional search. The New York Court of Appeals never questioned the impor-
tant and laudable government interests served by the VIN, recognizing that there is "a
compelling police interest, in situations such as automobile thefts and accidents, in the
positive identification of vehicles." 63 N.Y.2d at 495,472 N.E.2d at 1012,483 N.Y.S.2d
at 184.
Moreover, the court of appeals also acknowledged that motorists have no legitimate
expectation of privacy in locations in a car that are ordinarily in plain view from outside
the vehicle. Id. at 494, 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183. The court stated that
"an officer's simply peering inside an automobile does not constitute a search and the
Fourth Amendment... does not limit this activity." Id. at 494-95, 472 N.E.2d at 1011,
483 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (citations omitted). Thus, the first half of the Supreme Court ma-
jority's opinion does not directly address the constitutional issue under review. 106 S.
Ct. at 971 (Brennan, J., dissenting)("By focusing on the object of the search-the VIN-
the Court misses the issue we must decide: whether an interior search of the car to dis-
cover that object was constitutional.")(emphasis in original).
78 106 S. Ct. at 966.
79 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In its narrowest form, Terry held that where an officer reason-
ably concludes that a suspect he is confronting is armed and dangerous, that officer may
conduct a limited search of the suspect to discover weapons which might be used against
him. Id. at 30.
In reaching this result, the Teny Court explained that because the facts involved a
type of police conduct-"on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat"--the
fourth amendment's traditional requirements of probable cause and a judicial warrant
were not practical. Id. at 20. Instead, the police conduct would be judged under a bal-
ancing formula to assess its reasonableness. That formula involved a dual inquiry. First,
was the officer's intrusion justified at its inception? Second, was the intrusion reason-
ably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place? Id.
80 106 S. Ct. at 966.
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meaning of the fourth amendment.8 1  Nevertheless, Justice
O'Connor noted that if Class had stayed in his car and acceded to a
request to remove the paper obstructing the VIN plate, Officer Mc-
Namee "would not have needed to intrude into the passenger
compartment."8
2
Justice O'Connor next depicted the apparent dilemma con-
fronting Officer McNamee: he could have had Class return to the
car to remove the obstructing paper, or he could continue to detain
Class briefly outside of the car while he himself entered to examine
the VIN.8 3 For Justice O'Connor, the former option was unaccept-
able because it would have exposed the officer to potentially grave
risks.84
The pistol beneath the seat did not, of course, disappear when respon-
dent closed the car door behind him. To have returned respondent
immediately to the automobile would have placed the officer in the
same situation that the holding in [Pennsylvania v.] Mimms 8 5 allows of-
ficers to avoid-permitting an individual being detained to have possi-
ble access to a dangerous weapon and the benefit of the partial
concealment provided by the car's exterior.
8 6
From this proposition, Justice O'Connor noted that warrantless
searches were permitted in certain law enforcement contexts despite
their substantial intrusiveness. Under the rationale of Terry, the
constitutionality of a warrantless search is to be judged by balancing
the need to search against the intrusion which the search entails.
According to Justice O'Connor, three factors existed which justified
Officer McNamee's search. "[T]he safety of the officers was served
by the intrusion; the intrusion was minimal; and the search stemmed
81 Id.
82 Id. at 967.
83 Id. As phrased by Justice O'Connor, the question was "whether the officers could
not only effect the seizure of [Class] necessary to detain him briefly outside the vehicle,
but also effect a search for the VIN that may have been necessary only because of that
detention." Id.
84 Id. Of course, Officer McNamee was not cognizant of any danger when he ap-
proached Class' vehicle to look for the VIN. He simply sought the VIN. When he could
not find it on the door jamb, he immediately proceeded to the next location where he
thought it might be. When this area was obscured by paper, he entered the vehicle.
During the brief moments that it took for Officer McNamee to accomplish his mission,
he probably never thought of returning Class to the vehicle in order to have Class move
the paper that was obstructing the VIN. It was simply much easier for Officer McNamee
to do it himself.
85 434 U.S. 106 (1977)(per curiam). In Mimms the Court held that an officer's order
to a motorist to exit his vehicle, issued after the motorist was lawfully stopped for a
traffic infraction, was constitutionally permissible. The Court explained that the "mere
inconvenience" for the motorist could not "prevail when balanced against legitimate
concerns for the officer's safety." Id, at I11.
86 106 S. Ct. at 967.
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from some probable cause focusing suspicion on the individual af-
fected by the search. Indeed, [Officer McNamee's] probable cause
stemmed from directly observing [Class] commit a violation of the
law."'8 7 Weighed against these governmental interests was Class' in-
terest in the privacy of his automobile. Because Class had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the VIN plate and had committed
two traffic violations, Justice O'Connor found that the competing
interests weighed in favor of the police intrusion.
88
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, characterized the ma-
jority's opinion as an application of "conventional" fourth amend-
ment analysis.8 9 He argued that an officer's efforts to observe a VIN
should not be subjected to the same scrutiny that governs police
intrusions into a vehicle in order to arrest or to search for evidence
of crime.90 Justice Powell suggested that Officer McNamee's entry
to examine the VIN was part of the administrative process associ-
ated with the lawful stop of Class' vehicle. For Justice Powell, the
only issue was whether the officer's actions were reasonable. 91 Be-
cause it had not been proven that Officer McNamee's intrusion "was
not reasonably necessary to achieve his lawful purpose," his search
of the vehicle, according to Justice Powell, did not violate any of
Class' fourth amendment rights.
92
In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the Court for sanctioning
a search of a private area notwithstanding a lack of objective cause
justifying the search. 93 He contended the analysis of the majority
could not be squared with the automobile exception to the fourth
amendment, which permits warrantless searches of automobiles
provided the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle con-
tains contraband or criminal evidence. 94 Furthermore, the Court's
reasoning was not consistent with Teny v. Ohio and its progeny be-
cause the officers had no reasonable grounds to support the
87 Id. at 968.
88 Id. at 968-69. As phrased by the Court, the necessary balancing compelled the
holding that "this search was sufficiently unintrusive to be constitutionally permissible in
light of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN and the fact that the
officers observed [Class] commit two traffic violations." Id.
89 Id. at 969 (Powell, J., concurring).
90 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
91 Id. at 970 (Powell, J., concurring).
92 Id. at 970 (Powell, J., concurring). But cf. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 377 n.1 (1976)(Powell,J., concurring) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
360 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring))("Routine inventories of automobiles intrude upon
an area in which the private citizen has a 'reasonable expectation of privacy.' ").
93 106 S. Ct. at 970-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 971 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
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search.
95
Justice White, in his brief dissent, also criticized the majority's
analysis. He argued that, in effect, the Court's holding provided a
blanket authorization for the police to search a car for the VIN
whenever there is a legal stop.
9 6
VII. ANALYSIS OF CLASS
The first section of this part of the Article will discuss why the
result in Class cannot be defended persuasively by the facile asser-
tion that Class held no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN
and little expectation of privacy in his automobile. The next section
focuses on the reasoning proffered by the Court in support of its
conclusion that Officer McNamee's search was permissible. This
section reveals that the Court's analysis and result are inconsistent
with its prior cases and antithetical to the purpose of the fourth
amendment, which is to prohibit arbitrary police invasions. The fi-
nal section of this part of the Article describes the Court's new test
for determining the constitutionality of police investigative intru-
sions. This section will assess the new formula and explain why the
Court's test weakens fourth amendment freedoms.
A. AUTOMOBILE REGULATION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
1. Questions left unanswered by the Court
Putting aside the actual result, the most striking feature of the
Class opinion is the number of questions the Court leaves unan-
swered. First, on what doctrinal basis does the majority's ruling
rest? Is it an expansion of the automobile exception to the fourth
amendment,97 or is it another Terry balancing case in which the
Court is reviewing the ad hocjudgments of an officer in the field? Is
95 Id. at 974-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 975 (White, J., dissenting).
97 Thejudicially-created automobile exception (also known as the Carroll doctrine) to
the fourth amendment's warrant requirement allows police to search an automobile
where there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of
a crime. The automobile exception was first established in Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925), where the Court ruled that an automobile's ready mobility justified
dispensing with the fourth amendment's warrant procedure. Id. at 153. See also United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 (1982)("Given the nature of an automobile in
transit, the [Carroll] Court recognized that an immediate intrusion is necessary if police
officers are to secure the illicit substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a
warrantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable.").
Since the Carroll decision, the Court has relied on an additional aspect of the auto-
mobile to justify the automobile exception. This aspect is the lesser expectation of pri-
vacy one has in an automobile. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality
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the Court now saying that police officers have carte blanche to
search automobiles lawfully stopped? Or, is the Court merely hold-
ing that a search for documents or another object associated with
the state's regulation of the automobile is permissible, despite a lack
of objective justification for the search? If that is all the Class major-
ity intended to hold, however, how could such a ruling be limited?
Could the police search a motorist's glove compartment for a regis-
tration certificate? Could the police enter a vehicle to search for a
motorist's driver's license inadvertently left behind in the motorist's
purse, suitcase or attache case? Also, could a police officer who is
conducting a lawful roadblock check for licenses or drunk-driving
forcibly open a motorist's door to check the VIN or demand entry
underneath the hood or into some other secret location in order to
inspect the VIN? Finally, could the police forcibly enter a locked
and lawfully parked vehicle to inspect the VIN?
98
No one could expect that the Court's opinion in Class would (or
could) answer all of these questions. Nevertheless, these questions
do arise after a reading of the decision. The opinion of the majority
did not address the practical consequences of its reasoning and pro-
vided little guidance for future resolution of these troubling ques-
tions. In the criminal procedure context, the Court should always
strive to provide guidance to lower courts and government officials
who must apply the Court's articulated principles on a daily basis.99
If the Court's ruling addresses unchartered terrain, the Court must
furnish a sound constitutional basis so that its judgment will provide
an analytical foundation upon which later rulings can rest. The
Court in Class failed to provide such guidance or rationale.
As will be discussed below,100 the Class ruling provides no gui-
dance to police officers or lower courts who are confronted with is-
sues similar to those decided in Class. Moreover, the Class opinion
lacked a sound doctrinal basis. Because Officer McNamee lacked
probable cause for the search, the Class ruling cannot rest on the
automobile exception to the fourth amendment. 10 Nevertheless, it
opinion)("A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thor-
oughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.").
Finally, in its most recent discussion of the automobile exception, the Court stated
that the lesser expectations of privacy associated with the automobile "derive not from
the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive regulation of
vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways." California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 392 (1985).
98 See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 181, 622 P.2d 1199, 1209 (1980)(en banc).
99 LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Di-
lemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 141.
100 See infra notes 267-68, 386-402 and accompanying text.
101 See infra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
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appears after a reading of the first half of the opinion that the Court
intends to find that the search of Class' vehicle was valid under the
automobile exception. Why else would the majority devote so much
space and go into so much detail on the "important role played by
the VIN in the pervasive governmental regulation of the automo-
bile" 10 2 and the lack of privacy in the VIN itself? If, however, the
automobile exception only authorizes searches supported by prob-
able cause,103 what is the relevancy in finding that the VIN plays a
vital role in automobile regulation and that a motorist has no pri-
vacy expectations in the VIN itself? One is left to conclude that the
Court has offered these strawmen to divert the reader from the fact
that the Class ruling lacks any connection with the Court's prior
cases under the automobile exception.
2. Class may not rest on a driver's lack of privacy in his car or the VIN
The Court began its discussion of the fourth amendment issue
in Class by explaining the governmental purposes served by the VIN.
The majority noted that the VIN is useful to the federal government
as a means of improving the "efficacy of recall campaigns, and [it]
assists researchers in determining the risks of driving various makes
and models of automobiles."' 1 4 The VIN serves state officials in the
implementation of insurance laws by reducing the number of per-
sons injured in car accidents who go uncompensated for lack of in-
surance. It also helps state officials ensure that motorists are driving
safe vehicles, and it assists law enforcement officials in combating
automobile theft.105 Because of these useful purposes, federal law
requires manufacturers to place the VIN in the plain view of some-
one outside the automobile. 10 6 The Class majority declared that this
requirement was "amply justified."'' 0 7
All of this is true but irrelevant. In fact, the Court had already
recognized the authority of the states to ensure that "only those
qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that
102 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 966.
103 See infra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
104 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 964.
105 Id. at 965.
106 Id.
107 Id. Although it was not explained in the Court's opinion, the federal regulations
which require that the VIN be placed in plain view are directed at manufacturers of
automobiles, and not motorists themselves. 49 CFR § 571.115(S4.6) (1984); see 106 S.
Ct. at 979 (Powell, J., concurring). Moreover, at the time Class was stopped, there was
no independent state law requirement that motorists always have the VIN visible to an
observer standing outside the vehicle. New York law merely authorized an officer "to
demand information necessary to identify a vehicle." People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d at 696,
472 N.E.2d at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 185 (emphasis in original). See supra note 58.
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[their] vehicles are fit for safe operation, and... that licensing, re-
gistration and vehicle inspection requirements are being ob-
served."108 Neither Class nor the court of appeals questioned the
authority of the federal or state government to utilize the VIN in its
regulatory processes.10 9 Finally, none of the lower courts address-
ing the issue of the constitutionality of a police intrusion to examine
the VIN had questioned the authority of a police officer to demand
visual access to the VIN as part of a legitimate regulatory inspec-
tion.1 10 It is possible that the Court provided this background detail
on the VIN and its significance in the "web of regulation of the auto-
mobile" in order to lay a foundation for the unexpected holding
that the search of Class' vehicle would be upheld under the automo-
bile exception to the fourth amendment. This exception was first
announced in Carroll v. United States" ' and was more recently ex-
panded in United States v. Ross" 2 and United States v. Johns.113 This
reasoning, however, did not materialize.
The Court next turned to the motorist's lack of privacy in the
VIN itself 1 14 The "factors that generally diminish the reasonable
expectation of privacy in automobiles," the Court said, "are applica-
ble afortiori to the VIN." 115 Because the VIN serves a vital regula-
tory function,
[a] motorist must surely expect that such regulation will on occasion
require the State to determine the VIN of his or her vehicle, and the
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby
diminished. This is especially true in the case of a driver who has com-
mitted a traffic violation. 116
This reasoning seems unobjectionable. Most drivers do not ex-
pect as much privacy in a car as they have at home. 117 They also
108 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979).
109 Indeed, the court of appeals recognized that the VIN helped to facilitate the "com-
pelling police interest.., in the positive identification of vehicles." 63 N.Y.2d at 495,
472 N.E.2d at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
110 See, e.g., United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1970), cited in 1 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 34, § 2.5(d) at 454-55.
111 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
112 456 U.S. 798 (1982). In Ross the Court held that the police may, during a lawful
stop of a vehicle, conduct a warrantless search of compartments and containers within
the vehicle where they have probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed
somewhere in the vehicle.
113 469 U.S. 478 (1985). The Johns Court construed Ross as authorizing a warrantless
search of packages three days after they were removed from vehicles that police officers
had probable cause to believe contained contraband.
114 106 S. Ct. at 965.
115 Id. at 966.
116 Id.
117 In California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), the Court explained that
automobiles are subject! to a lesser expectation of privacy because of their inherent mo-
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anticipate periodic government inspection' 18 to ensure that their ve-
hicles are operated in a safe and responsible manner. 119 Further-
more, a driver who has committed a traffic violation can expect to be
questioned by the police and asked to produce evidence of his right
to operate an automobile.
120
A closer examination of the Court's language, however, reveals
several problems. Justice O'Connor declared that because the VIN
plays an important regulatory role, "[a] motorist must surely expect
that such regulation will on occasion require the State to determine
the VIN of his or her vehicle."' 121 Was the Court suggesting that all
motorists, no matter what the occasion, can (or should) expect that a
police officer will demand-and expect to receive-access to the ve-
hicle's VIN? Although not noted in the majority's opinion, the VIN
is not always located on the doorjamb or in the left-hand corner of
the windshield. 122 Some VINs are stamped "in secret locations gen-
erally known only to law enforcement personnel,"' 123 including the
bility and the pervasive regulation of them by the government. According to Carney,
"[t]he public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of
this compelling governmental need for regulation." Id. at 392. Thus, the Court held
that the fourth amendment was not violated when the police conducted a warrantless
search, based on probable cause, of a motor home located in a public place.
An issue left open in Carney, whether the automobile exception was equally applica-
ble to a motor home that is "situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is
being used as a residence," id. at 394 n.3, was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1986). The Hamilton court held that a motor
home parked in a private residential driveway and connected to the home's electrical
utilities could be searched without a warrant where the police have probable cause. The
court dismissed the claim that the utility connection rendered this situation outside the
scope of Carney's applicability. "A connection to electrical utilities by means of an exten-
sion cord is hardly the kind of 'pipe and drain' connection that would render the motor
home more permanent and less mobile as was contemplated in Camey." 792 F.2d at
843.
118 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
119 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659-60, noting that automobile licenses are issued periodi-
cally to ensure driver competency, and registration and vehicle inspection programs are
designed to keep dangerous automobiles off the roads. Such requirements, "properly
administered, are essential elements in a highway safety program." Id. at 658.
120 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).
121 106 S. Ct. at 966.
122 See, e.g., State v. Moore, 66 Haw. 202, 659 P.2d 70 (1983)(per curiam)(entry into
the vehicle was necessary to inspect the VIN; because the entry was not justified by
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was involved with a crime, the
entry was unlawful); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)(en
banc)(though defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the VIN itself, he
did hold constitutionally protected expectation of privacy that the police would not
enter his locked vehicle to inspect a VIN hidden from public view); see also State v.
Sidebotham, 124 N.H. 682, 474 A.2d 1377 (1984) and State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101,
467 A.2d 571 (1983)(official inspection of a VIN not in plain view is a search under State
Constitution).
123 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 34, § 2.5(d) at 453.
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underside of the hood and the rear axle. 124 If one reads Class liter-
ally, motorists "must surely expect" that because of the pervasive
nature of government regulation of automobiles, the police will be
free to look under the vehicle's hood, crawl underneath the car or
demand entry to some other secret location with no objective justifi-
cation. This assertion is a questionable one.
The average motorist has a greater expectation of privacy in his
or her vehicle than the Court is willing to admit. For example, hy-
pothesize the average driver who, returning home on a Saturday
night after a movie, encounters a typical driver's license and vehicle
registration check or driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) roadblock. 12 5
After the vehicle is stopped at such a roadblock, an officer usually
requests that the motorist produce his license and registration, 126
presumably to ascertain whether the driver and his vehicle are enti-
fled to be on the road. After the Class decision, that same driver
now "must surely expect" that the same governmental interest
which justifies the officer's demand for his license and registration,
will also justify the officer, without any additional objective justifica-
tion, opening the driver's door, entering the vehicle to move away
some paper innocently placed on the dashboard, forcibly opening
the hood, crawling underneath the vehicle, or effecting some other
intrusion into the vehicle to ascertain the VIN. Of course, any no-
tion by the Court or anyone else familiar with police-motorist en-
counters of such an expectation by a motorist is unrealistic.
All motorists do expect that their driving abilities and their cars'
performance will be the subject of "properly administered"'127 peri-
odic government regulation. Such regulation often will be inconve-
nient and may temporarily interfere with a motorist's freedom of
movement. But, the average motorist does not expect anything
more than a temporary restraint of his freedom.128 It is untenable
to assert that the average motorist will "surely expect" a police inva-
124 Although Justice O'Connor was certainly correct in stating that "federal law re-
quires that the VIN be placed in view of someone outside the automobile," 106 S. Ct. at
965 (citing 49 CFR § 571.115 (S 4.6)(1984))(emphasis in original), police officers often
check both the public and confidential VIN when investigating vehicles. See, e.g., State v.
Sidebotham, 124 N.H. 682, 474 A.2d 1377 (1984); Dick v. State, 596 P.2d 1265 (Okla.
Grim. App. 1979); Commonwealth v. Grabowski, 452 A.2d 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
125 For an interesting discussion of wholesale, suspicionless sobriety checkpoints, see
Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protections, 12 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 123 (1984).
126 See Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of
Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1460-63 (1983).
127 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658.
128 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)(A motorist's expectations dur-
ing a routine traffic stop "are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time
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sion of his vehicle in order to inspect a VIN during routine police-
motorist encounters. A police intrusion without any objective justi-
fication that goes beyond a simple request for a license and registra-
tion is not something that a motorist "must surely expect" as a
result of the government's pervasive regulation of his automobile.
The Court's analysis is unconvincing for an additional reason.
In its haste to find that a motorist has no expectation of privacy in
the VIN, the Court failed to distinguish between the degree of pri-
vacy one can expect with regard to the VIN and the degree of pri-
vacy one has in the particular area in which the VIN is located.
Justice O'Connor did not recognize that the degree of privacy one
has in an identification number is wholly different from the degree
of privacy one can reasonably expect in the portion of the vehicle
which must be transversed in order to examine the VIN.
In Smith v. Maryland,129 the Court recognized this important dis-
tinction in a different context. The Smith Court held that the war-
rantless installation and use of a pen register13 0 by the police did
not constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun rejected the defend-
ant's claim that, notwithstanding the absence of a physical trespass,
the police action infringed on a legitimate expectation of privacy
which the defendant held regarding the numbers he dialed on his
phone.
[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they
must "convey" phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is
through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are
completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the telephone com-
pany has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they
dial. '3 1
Though the Court ultimately held that Smith had no expectation of
privacy in the numbers he dialed, its conclusion rested on the fact
that the police activities in Smith did not intrude into a "constitution-
ally protected area" of the defendant's property. 132
The Class Court's analysis also overlooked the view that the
answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registra-
tion .. ")(footnote omitted).
129 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
130 The Court explained that a pen register is " 'a mechanical device that records the
numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the
dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does
not indicate whether calls are actually completed.'" Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United
States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).
131 442 U.S. at 742.
132 Id. at 741 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
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fourth amendment protects against official invasions of privacy,
even when the intrusion appears to some to be trivial. Arizona v.
Hicks 13 3 recently recognized this principle. In Hicks, police officers
entered Hicks' apartment after learning that an individual in the
apartment below Hicks' had been shot through the floor from the
apartment above. The police found no one in Hicks' apartment, but
they seized several weapons. After noticing expensive stereo equip-
ment, one of the officers became suspicious that the equipment
might have been stolen because it "seemed out of place in the
squalid and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment." 134 The
officer moved the equipment to inspect the serial number, which he
recorded. After being informed over the phone that one piece of
the equipment had been taken in an armed robbery, the officer im-
mediately seized it. A later check of the other serial numbers re-
vealed that the remaining equipment had also been stolen. Based
on this information, a warrant was issued which authorized the
seizure of the equipment.'3 5
On appeal, Arizona contended that the moving of the equip-
ment and the recording of the serial numbers constituted neither a
"search" nor a "seizure." The Court agreed that merely recording
the numbers did not constitute a seizure because it did not mean-
ingfully interfere with Hicks' possessory interests. 136 The Court re-
jected, however, the assertion that no search had occurred:
Merely inspecting those parts of the turntable that came into view dur-
ing the [initial invasion of the apartment] would not have constituted
an independent search, because it would have produced no additional
invasion of respondent's privacy interest. But taking action, unrelated
to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view
concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new
invasion of respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circum-
stances that validated the entry.13 7
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Hicks rejected the claim
that this position trivialized the fourth amendment. For Justice
Scalia, the question was not whether the challenged search involved
merely the moving of an item a few inches to disclose something of
little value. Rather, the question was whether the police action ex-
posed portions of the apartment not otherwise visible. It was not
important, therefore, "that the search uncovered nothing of any
great personal value to the respondent-serial numbers rather than
133 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
134 Id. at 1152.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. (citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983)).
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(what might conceivably have been hidden behind or under the
equipment) letters or photographs. A search is a search, even if it
happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable."
1 38
A similar allowance is not available when the police invade the
interior of a car to inspect a VIN. An officer's observation of a VIN
visible to anyone looking through the windshield does not implicate
the fourth amendment privacy interests of a motorist because the
officer is only observing that which is in plain view.139 Where, how-
ever, an officer must invade the interior of a vehicle to examine the
VIN, a motorist's expectations of privacy are threatened because the
officer may intrude upon an area of the vehicle that is otherwise con-
cealed from view. This point was aptly noted by an Illinois appellate
court in the 1981 case of People v. Piper. The court stated that
[a]lthough one's expectation of privacy in the number may be no dif-
ferent, it is surely a matter of common sense that one's expectation of
privacy in that which can be seen from outside the car is significantly
different from that which can be seen only when the door has been
opened. Otherwise, why bother to put things in the glove compart-
ment, under the seat, or, as here, behind the seat and out of the view
of passers-by?1
40
Despite its broad language and questionable assumption about
the reasonable privacy expectations of motorists, perhaps the Class
Court intended its pronouncement regarding expectations of pri-
vacy possessed by motorists to apply only to those drivers who have
138 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152.
139 See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)(plurality opinion); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)(plurality opinion). Compare United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)(warrantless monitoring on an electronic beeper inside a
container of chemicals was not a search when it revealed no information that could not
have been obtained through visual surveillance) with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 714 (1984)(monitoring of a beeper in a private home, "a location not open to visual
surveillance," constituted a search, and was therefore in violation of the fourth amend-
ment rights of persons with a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home). For a
perceptive criticism of Knolls, see LaFave, supra note 23.
140 People v. Piper, 101 Ill. App. 3d 296, 301, 427 N.E.2d. 1361, 1364 (1981). In
Piper, the court held that an officer's opening of the door of a vehicle to examine the VIN
during a routine traffic accident investigation, without the consent of the driver and in
the absence of any suspicion of criminal conduct, violated the fourth amendment. See
also State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 184-85, 622 P.2d 1199, 1208-09 (1980)(en
banc) ("The degree of privacy interest in the part of the vehicle where the VIN is located
is a separate question from the extent of privacy interest in the serial number itself....
The location of the VIN can have a significant effect on an individual's privacy interest.
When VINs are stamped on the exterior parts of a vehicle or on the part of the dash-
board that is plainly visible through the windshield, the numbers are fully exposed to the
public.... A different question is presented when the VIN is hidden from public view
on some interior portion of the vehicle, and it is necessary to enter the vehicle in order
to view it.") See also United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 441, 447 (5th Cir.
1970) (Godbold, J., dissenting).
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committed traffic violations.14 1 But even by accepting this much, 142
the Class majority still overestimated the average driver's expecta-
tions of lesser amounts of privacy in his automobile and documents.
As Justice Stevens has noted, "it is perfectly obvious that the mil-
lions of traffic stops that occur every year are not fungible."' 143 It is
indefensible to suggest that motorists who have committed traffic
violations retain no constitutional interest against arbitrary police
invasions into their cars, and any such suggestion has serious and
dangerous implications for fourth amendment freedoms.
Indeed, the Court has already dismissed the contention that a
valid seizure of an individual grants the police unlimited authority to
search the premises of the person seized. In Chimel v. Caifornia,
144
the Court, while delineating the permissible scope of a search inci-
dent to arrest, rejected the position that "once an arrest has been
made [in a suspect's home], the additional invasion of privacy stem-
ming from the accompanying search [of the home] is 'relatively mi-
nor.' "145 The Chimel Court stated that it could see "no reason why,
simply because some interference with an individual's privacy and
freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, further intrusions
should automatically be allowed despite the absence of a warrant
that the fourth amendment would otherwise require."' 146 This prin-
141 See 106 S. Ct. at 966 (the expectation of a motorist that the state will, on occasion,
be required to determine the motorist's VIN "is especially true in the case of a driver
who has committed a traffic violation.").
142 It is doubtful the Court intended a narrow construction of its holding such that
only those motorists who have committed traffic violations would be subject to a police
officer's inspection of the VIN. The pertinent passage reads as follows:
The factors that generally diminish the reasonable expectation of privacy in
automobiles are applicable afortiori to the VIN .... [T]he VIN plays an important
part in the pervasive regulation by the government of the automobile. A motorist
must surely expect that such regulation will on occasion require the State to deter-
mine the VIN of his or her vehicle, and the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy in the VIN is thereby diminished. This is especially true in the case of a
driver who has committed a traffic violation.
Id. at 966.
Instead of referring only to motorists who have committed traffic infractions, the
Court casts its language in general terms. Furthermore, the sentence following the gen-
eral pronouncement that motorists "must surely expect" government regulation requir-
ing access to the VIN highlights, rather than modifies, the general expectation that the
state will demand access to the VIN on occasion.
143 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibror, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV.
39, 87 (1968)(The Teny ruling makes it clear that "whether it is proper to make a protec-
tive search incident to a stopping for investigation is a question separate from the issue
of whether it is permissible to stop the suspect; not all stops call for a frisk.").
144 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
145 Id. at 766 n.12.
146 Id. See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1978)(rejecting the claim that
a person lawfully taken into police custody retains no right of privacy in his home).
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ciple is equally applicable to the motorist traveling on the highway:
a lawful stop does not automatically provide justification for a
search. Imagine for example, the harried mother who leaves the
house in a hurry to drive the kids to school. Inadvertently, she ex-
ceeds the speed limit on a twenty-five mile per hour stretch of sub-
urban roadway. Certainly, in this instance, it is fair to assume that
this motorist can be expected to be stopped and requested to pro-
duce proof of her license and registration certificate. Is it also fair to
assume that this motorist retains no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy against an officer's unnecessary intrusion into her vehicle to
ascertain the VIN?
The majority's reasoning also cannot be confined to apply only
to intrusions to ascertain the VIN. Suppose a motorist has commit-
ted a minor traffic infraction and is ordered by police to get out of
her car.147 If she forgets to bring her registration certificate or has
left her driver's license in some other location inside the car, Class
would sanction a police intrusion into the vehicle to retrieve the
documents. This hypothetical situation is not a far-fetched reading
of Class. The arguments in support of such a search are obvious
enough. First, automobiles are properly the subject of extensive
governmental regulation, and, thus, "every operator of a motor ve-
hicle must expect that the State, in enforcing its regulations, will
intrude to some extent upon that operator's privacy."' 148 Second,
"the factors that generally diminish the reasonable expectation of
privacy in automobiles are applicable afortiori to a [driver's license
or registration certificate]."' 149 Both play "an important part in the
pervasive regulation by the government of the automobile."' 150
Third, in light of this important role, "a motorist must surely expect
that such regulation will on occasion require the State to determine
[the existence of a driver's license or registration certificate], and
the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in [both the li-
cense and registration certificate] is thereby diminished."'151
Fourth, "[t]his is especially true in the case of a driver who has com-
mitted a traffic violation."' 52 Therefore, the officer's intrusion into
the vehicle's glove compartment to retrieve a registration certificate
inadvertently left behind 153 or the officer's search of a driver's purse
147 The fourth amendment clearly permits the police to do this much. Mimms, 434
U.S. at 108-11 (1977)(per curiam).
148 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 965.




153 In some instances a failure to bring registration and insurance documents, nor-
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or travel bag in order to obtain a driver's license are reasonable be-
cause the motorists in these instances possessed a lesser expectation
of privacy in their automobiles and no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the objects of the police intrusion.'
5 4
The claim of the Class Court that "it is unreasonable to have an
expectation of privacy in an object required by law to be located in a
place ordinarily in plain view from the exterior of the automo-
bile" 155 did not provide any substance to the Court's rationale. The
assertion is not convincing. Consider, for example, a police officer
who has stopped a motorist for driving without a visible license
plate. And, suppose also that the motorist tells the officer that the
temporary license plate has fallen from the rear windshield of the
car. Under the majority's rationale, the motorist cannot reasonably
have an expectation of privacy in the license plate, because the li-
cense plate is, after all, a part of the pervasive regulation of the auto-
mobile and is required by law to be located in a place in plain view.
The officer, therefore, would be permitted to conduct a search of
the vehicle in order to discover and inspect the license plate as part
of the administrative procedures associated with a routine traffic
stop.
Furthermore, the assertion that a motorist cannot reasonably
expect any privacy in an object required by law to be in plain view is
irrelevant to a logical resolution of the constitutional question
under review. In this respect, this lack of reasonable expectation
rationale is similar to the majority's earlier discussion about the
laudable governmental purposes served by, and lack of privacy sur-
rounding, the VIN. It is obvious, at least to the Court, that the "ex-
terior of a car.., is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it
mally located in the glove compartment, may not be the product of inadvertance. Driv-
ers stopped by police, especially in large urban areas, are frequently cautioned to avoid
unnecessary movements while seated inside a vehicle, especially any movement that
looks like one might be reaching for a gun.
154 This author is not the only one to detect such troublesome implications from the
Class opinion. Justice White was also unprepared to follow the majority's reasoning:
Had Class remained in his car and refused an officer's order (1) to turn over his
registration certificate and (2) to remove the article obscuring the VIN, there would
have been no more justification for entering the interior of the car and doing what
was necessary to read the VIN than there would have been to enter and search for
the registration certificate in the glove compartment. It may be that under our
cases, Class could have been sanctioned for his refusal in such a case, but we have
never held that his refusal would permit a search of the glove compartment. Even if
it did, it would be different if there was no refusal at all, but just an entry to find a
registration certificate. If that is the case, this one is no different in kind: there was
no refusal and nothing but a non-consensual entry to search without probable cause
and without emergent circumstances.
106 S. Ct. at 975 (White, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 966.
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does not constitute a 'search.' "156 The New York Court of Appeals,
however, did not hold, nor did Class claim, that merely viewing the
VIN from outside the car constituted an impermissible search.
Rather, the court of appeals based its reversal of Class' conviction
on the ground that Officer McNamee's conduct-opening the door
and reaching inside-constituted a search because it was "under-
taken to obtain information and it exposed... hidden areas"' 57 of
Class' vehicle that were not in plain view. In other words, the intru-
sion to discover the VIN, an object in which Class concedely held no
legitimate privacy interest, invaded an area in which Class reasonably
could expect to remain free from unreasonable police scrutiny. By
focusing on the object of the search-the discovery of the VIN-the
Class majority avoided confronting the constitutional issue decided
below, namely, whether a police officer's nonconsensual entry into
an automobile to determine the VIN, based solely on a stop for a
traffic infraction, violated the fourth amendment.' 58
Finally, it is erroneous to suggest that the holding in Class will
have no impact on other types of police intrusions involving lawful
stops of motorists. The reasoning of Class will apply to cases in
which a motorist has to produce an object for inspection as well as
to cases in which a motorist has to keep information visible to the
public. Class cannot be confined to VIN searches. It is significant,
therefore, that the Court did not explain the constitutional differ-
ence between requiring a motorist to keep certain items exposed for
possible police inspection and requiring a motorist to produce other
items for police scrutiny.
Consider again, the harried parent who is driving to work after
dropping off the kids at school. The parent is stopped validly for a
minor traffic infraction and is asked to exit her vehicle.' 59 Assume
further that the motorist inadvertently leaves her driver's license in-
side her purse or forgets to bring her automobile registration certifi-
cate with her. The motorist's momentary forgetfulness does not
relieve her of the obligation to produce for the investigating officer
her driver's license or registration certificate. Under the rationale of
Class, the officer is not required to return the motorist to her vehicle
because that would permit "an individual being detained to have
156 Id.
157 People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 495, 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
158 See 106 S. Ct. at 971 (Brennan, J., dissenting)("By focusing on the object of the
search-the VIN-the Court misses the issue we must decide: whether an interior search
of the car, to discover that object was constitutional.")(emphasis in original).
159 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)(per curiam), discussed infra notes
201-06 and accompanying text.
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possible access to a dangerous weapon and the benefit of the partial
concealment provided by the car's exterior."160 Even assuming an
independent obligation of motorists to keep their VIN plates con-
stantly visible to passersby-an obligation similar in nature to the
obligation of motorists to produce driver's licenses or registration
certificates upon the valid demand of investigating police officers, it
cannot be persuasively argued that the Court's reasoning in Class is
limited to its particular facts. From the motorist's point of view and
from a constitutional perspective, being forced to produce an item
associated with the web of automobile regulation is no different
from being forced to expose the VIN. In each instance in which the
motorist, for whatever reason, cannot satisfy the demands of investi-
gating officers, police are left free to intrude into the vehicle's inte-
rior. Thus, when a motorist is unable to produce requested
documents without returning to the automobile, the reasoning of
Class permits an officer to take the steps necessary to complete his
investigation, including entering private areas of the vehicle to re-
trieve documents. Therefore, the rationale of Class extends beyond
VIN searches.
The Court's emphasis on the vital regulatory role played by the
VIN and the propriety of requiring that it be placed in plain view did
not provide a foundation for the Court's reasoning and result. It is
readily apparent that the VIN serves several useful governmental
purposes. It is equally obvious that a motorist cannot or could not
claim a protective interest in the secrecy of a VIN ordinarily in plain
view of the public or in the secrecy of his license plate numbers.
These principles are undisputed, and they were not contested by the
parties or the lower courts. What was disputed, however, was the
constitutional validity of Officer McNamee's intrusion. The first half
of the majority's opinion failed to explain why the conduct of Officer
McNamee was within the boundaries of permissible police action
under established fourth amendment doctrine. The majority of the
Court appears to be willing to sanction any type of police intrusion
into a motorist's vehicle so long as that intrusion has some nexus to
the state's interest in regulating the automobile and its driver.
3. Class may not rest on the automobile exception
The basis of the automobile exception to the fourth amend-
ment was articulated by the Court in Carroll v. United States.' 6' In
Carroll, the Court held that because of the impracticability of ob-
160 106 S. Ct. at 967.
161 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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taining a warrant to search a movable vehicle, the police could
search the interior of an automobile without first obtaining a war-
rant from an independent magistrate.1 62 Carroll made clear, how-
ever, that the authority of the police to stop and search vehicles on
the nation's highways was not without limit. Only where an officer
has probable cause for believing that a particular vehicle is carrying
contraband or evidence of a crime is the officer permitted to con-
duct a warrantless search. 163 Absent such probable cause, a motor-
ist has a "right to free passage without interruption or search."' 164
Although the automobile exception has changed since its first
articulation in Carroll,165 the Court has not altered one of its original
requirements, namely, that before embarking on a search of a vehi-
cle, the police must have probable cause to believe that that vehicle
contains evidence of a crime. 166 This continued adherence to the
probable cause requirement is based on the belief that a contrary
rule would create the intolerable result that any vehicle could be
stopped and searched based on nothing more than the unsubstanti-
ated hunch or whim of the officer in the field. 167 Therefore, the
searching officer must possess objective facts which would justify the
issuance of a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate; sub-
jective good faith in the legitimacy of the search is not enough. 168
Without this requirement, the protections guaranteed by the fourth
amendment would "evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects,' only in the discretion of
162 Id. at 153.
163 Id. at 154.
164 Id.
165 See Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment
Considerations In a Post-Ross World, 62 NEB. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1983); Kamisar, United States
v. Ross: The Court Takes Another Look at The Container-in-the-Car Situation, in THE SUPREME
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-82, at 74-81 (J. Choper, Y. Kamisar & L.
Tribe eds. 1983). As Professor Kamisar has explained in his excellent critique of United
States v. Ross, the Carroll doctrine, as originally understood, allowed police to search a car
without a warrant on the basis of (a) probable cause to believe the car contained evi-
dence of crime and (b) the presence of " 'exigent circumstances' that made it impractical
to obtain a warrant." Kamisar, supra, at 74. In the mid-1970s, however, several deci-
sions of the Court chipped away at the exigency requirement. Finally, in Texas v. White,
423 U.S. 67 (1975)(per curiam), the Court eliminated the requirement entirely. After
White, it appeared that the Court had manufactured a new "probable cause" exception
to the warrant requirement for automobiles. In Professor Kamisar's view, the Ross deci-
sion merely extended the new exception created in White "to containers found anywhere
inside the car." Kamisar, supra, at 78.
166 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). See also
Kamisar, supra note 165, at 75.
167 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54.
168 Ross, 456 U.S. at 808.
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the police." 169 Indeed, in the Term preceding Class, the Court twice
reaffirmed the principle that the automobile exception was applica-
ble only to searches of vehicles which were based on probable
cause. 1
70
By applying this principle to the Class facts, it is clear that the
automobile exception to the fourth amendment did not legitimize
Officer McNamee's search. In fact, the Court recognized that "it
[was] undisputed that the police officers had no reason to suspect
that [Class'] car was stolen, that it contained contraband, or that
[Class] had committed an offense other than the traffic viola-
tions."' 71 Although New York had legitimate interests in regulating
Class' vehicle and in ordinarily requiring visual access to the VIN,
those interests, despite their pervasiveness, could not justify the sus-
pension of the probable cause requirement.
The police in Class had no probable cause to justify their entry
into Class' vehicle. The fact that Class had little expectation of pri-
vacy in his car and no legitimate expectation of privacy in the VIN
plate cannot be used as a bootstrap to utilize the automobile excep-
tion in this case. The lesser expectations of privacy and the exigen-
cies associated with the mobility of an automobile justify warrantless
searches "so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is
met."' 72 In Class, that standard was not met, and, hence, Officer
McNamee's search did not fall within the automobile exception.
In sum, the Class ruling cannot be justified by the reasons prof-
fered by the Court in the first half of its opinion. A motorist's lack
of privacy in the ITIN and the lesser expectation of privacy associ-
ated with an automobile do not provide a principled basis for the
Court's decision. Moreover, the automobile exception fails to sup-
port the Class result. Unfortunately, the Court was no more persua-
sive in the second half of the Class opinion.
B. BALANCING AWAY TERRY V. OHIO
The first half of the Class opinion appeared to lay the founda-
tion for a holding that Officer McNamee's search was permissible
under the automobile exception. The Court, however, abruptly
169 Teny, 392 U.S. at 22 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
170 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S.
478, 483-84 (1985). In Carney, the Court explained that a motorist's lesser expectation
of privacy in his automobile derived from the pervasive state regulation of his vehicle.
Carney, 471 U.S. at 392. The Carney Court, however, was careful to note that warrantless
searches of vehicles were only valid "so long as the overriding standard of probable
cause is met." Id.
171 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 963.
172 Carney, 471 U.S. at 392.
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shifted from a discussion of the pervasive state regulation of the au-
tomobile, of which the VIN played an important role, to a discussion
of the balance between the competing interests of the state and the
individual. Rather than extend the Carroll doctrine to allow arbitrary
searches of automobiles during routine traffic stops, the majority
utilized the balancing formula of Terry v. Ohio 17 3 to find that the
search of Class' vehicle was constitutionally reasonable. This con-
clusion was reached by both torturing the facts and by an unjustified
application of Terry and its progeny.
The Court began the second half of its opinion with a reason-
able conclusion: Officer McNamee's invasion of Class' automobile
was a search for fourth amendment purposes.' 74 An automobile's
"interior as a whole," the Court stated, is accorded some level of
fourth amendment protection against unreasonable police intru-
sions. 175 This assertion, however, was the final concession the
Court was prepared to make.
1. Preliminary balancing
a. "Blame the victim"
Before discussing why the search was reasonable under the
Terry balancing formula, the Court made two initial observations.
The first concerned the necessity for Officer McNamee's search.
The second involved the dangers that "would have been presented"
had Officer McNamee returned Class to his car in order to remove
the paper obstructing the gIN.
176
Regarding its first observation, the Court declared that a police
officer's "demand to inspect the VIN, like a demand to see license
and registration papers, is within the scope of police authority pur-
suant to a traffic violation stop.' 77 Therefore, if Class had re-
173 392 U.S. 1 (1968). As Justice O'Connor noted, under the Terry balancing formula,
the constitutional reasonableness of a challenged government intrusion is determined
" 'by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967)). Justice O'Connor, however, neglected to note that Terry
also set forth a two-step inquiry to aid the Court in assessing the reasonableness of
police intrusions that interfere with the personal security of citizens. That inquiry in-
volved considering "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the inter-
ference in the first place." 392 U.S. at 20.
174 106 S. Ct. at 966.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 967.
177 Id. at 966-67. § 401(4) of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law authorizes an officer
to demand information necessary to identify a vehicle. See People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d at
496-97, 472 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
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mained in his vehicle, "the police would have been justified in
asking him to move the papers obscuring the VIN."' 178 Class, how-
ever, exited his vehicle without removing the papers that obscured
the VIN, and Officer McNamee "chose to conduct his search with-
out asking [Class] to return to the car." 179 Thus, the Court was left
to decide "whether the officer acted within the bounds of the Fourth
Amendment in conducting the search." 18 0 The majority held that
he did.
On what basis does such a holding rest? The Class majority had
submitted no persuasive constitutional analysis up to this point in
the opinion to explain its result. The majority, perhaps, believed
that Class himself was responsible for the police intrusion. The
Court suggested this possibility in subtle terms.' 8l Apart from Jus-
tice O'Connor's suggestive language, the Court in an earlier case
indicated in manifest terms that the innocent behavior of an individ-
ual could form the basis for upholding an officer's otherwise ques-
tionable intrusion. This "blame the victim" theory arose out of the
Court's decision in United States v. Sharpe.18 2 In explaining why a
twenty-minute detention by a Drug Enforcement Agent and a state
police officer was not too long for purposes of a valid Terry investi-
gative stop of a motorist, the Court in Sharpe emphasized that "the
delay ... was attributable almost entirely to the evasive actions of
[the defendant, Savage], who sought to elude the police as [his co-
defendant, Sharpe] moved his Pontiac to the side of the road [in
response to a police signal to pull over]." 18 3 In a footnote, however,
the Sharpe majority offered the following comments.
Even if it could be inferred that Savage was not attempting to
elude the police when he drove his car between [Officer] Thrasher's
patrol car and Sharpe's Pontiac-in the process nearly hitting the pa-
trol car-such an assumption would not alter our analysis or our con-
clusion. The significance of Savage's actions is that, whether innocent
or purposeful, they made it necessary for [Officer] Thrasher and [Agent]
178 106 S. Ct. at 966.
179 Id. at 967.
180 Id.
181 "If [Class] had stayed in his vehicle and acceded to such a request [to remove the
paper obscuring the VIN] from the officer, the officer would not have needed to intrude
into the passenger compartment. [Class) chose, however, to exit the vehicle without
removing the papers that covered the VIN." Id. See also 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 34,
§ 2.5(d) at 457.
182 470 U.S. 675 (1985). In Sharpe, two law enforcement officers attempted to stop
two motorists (Sharpe, who was driving a Pontiac and Savage who was driving a pickup
truck) whom the officers suspected were transporting drugs. After one officer signaled
the Pontiac (the lead vehicle) to pull over, the pickup truck continued down the highway.
This action caused the officers to split up.
183 Id. at 687-88.
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Cooke to split up, placed Thrasher and Cooke out of contact with each
other, and required Cooke to enlist the assistance of local police
before he could join Thrasher and Savage.
184
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, characterized the majority's
attempt to blame Savage's innocent actions for the lengthy delay
surrounding his detention as an "astonishing assertion."' 8 5 He
stressed that if Savage's actions were indeed innocent, then it was
constitutionally indefensible to hold that he had somehow waived
his fourth amendment rights.
The Court contends that, "whether innocent or purposeful," Sav-
age's conduct "made ... necessary" the length of these detentions. If
the authorities did not reasonably carry out the stops, however, and if
Savage's continued driving was "innocent" conduct, it is logically and
constitutionally intolerable to hold that Savage waived important
Fourth Amendment rights because the events were his "innocent"
fault. 186
The Class majority apparently believed that the "blame the vic-
tim" theory used in Sharpe, even when applied to the concededly
innocent activity of a defendant such as Class, was not so astonish-
ing after all. Although the majority in Class did not refer to Sharpe,
this reasoning provided a convenient, though subtle, rationale for
the attempt to lay at least some of the blame for Officer McNamee's
intrusion on Class himself.
187
Even if one accepts the Court's unfair suggestion that Class
himself was responsible for Officer McNamee's search, it is plain
that the Court's result would have been the same whether Class ex-
ited the car on his own or whether he was ordered out by the police.
Justice O'Connor noted: "If [Class] had remained in the car, the
police would have been justified in asking him to move the papers
obscuring the VIN."' 188 The police, however, would not have been
required to proceed this way; they could have ordered Class to exit
the car as well. 18
9
Justice O'Connor declared later in the opinion that "[i]f [Class]
had stayed in his vehicle and acceded [to a request to remove the
paper], the officer would not have needed to intrude into the pas-
184 Id. at 688 n.6 (emphasis added).
185 Id. at 716 n.20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
187 Cf. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE LJ.
849, 891 n.257 (noting that "[e]ven innocent conduct by suspects that increases the time
required for police actions might support the reasonableness of a prolonged detention
on a rationale other than waiver").
188 106 S. Ct. at 966.
189 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)(per curiam). For a discussion of
Mimms, see infra notes 201-06.
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senger compartment."'190 But, as Justice O'Connor acknowledged
in her very next paragraph, if Class had stayed in the car, nothing in
the Constitution would have prevented the police from ordering
him out.' 9 1 Once outside, the police then could have entered the
passenger compartment to remove the papers.
Indeed, in her opinion in Michigan v. Long,192 Justice O'Connor
grants carte blanche to police to order motorists in and out of their
vehicles. The Court in Long upheld the right of police to conduct a
weapons search of the interior of a car where they have a reasonable
belief that the motorist is potentially dangerous. Long allows such
searches because "roadside encounters between police and suspects
are especially hazardous,"' 93 and an "officer must [often] make a
'quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possi-
ble danger ... ' "194
During such encounters between police and potentially danger-
ous motorists, police do not have to ask a driver to exit and move
away from the potentially dangerous vehicle. In Long, Justice
O'Connor expressly rejected the argument that police must pursue
this less intrusive and less dangerous alternative. As Professor
LaFave has noted, "police are not required 'to adopt alternative
means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved
in a Teny encounter.' "195 Instead, police officers "may ignore that
alternative (of keeping the driver away from the car) and thereby
create a continuing danger that justifies a search inside the automo-
bile for which the officer lacks probable cause."' 196 Of course, Long
cites no authority "to support this bootstrapping principle because
there is none."'
197
Long suggests therefore that after Class left his car, the police
could have asked him to go back inside and remove the papers. 98
The police in the first instance could have looked inside, and they
probably could have entered to make sure there were no weapons in
the car. In other words, the police not only have discretion to order
190 106 S. Ct. at 967.
191 See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11.
192 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
193 Id. at 1052 (a suspect may be permitted "to reenter the vehicle before the Terry
investigation is over"). See also 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 9.4(e) at 539.
194 463 U.S. at 1049.
195 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 34, § 9.4(e) at 528-29 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. at 1052).
196 463 U.S. at 1052 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28).
197 LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Noto-




motorists in and out of their vehicles, they also have the concomi-
tant authority to search those vehicles as a result of this discretion.
Therefore, the Court's discussion and reliance on Class' exit of his
vehicle is another red herring. It is apparent from the substantial
authority afforded police by the Long ruling that the Class Court
would have sanctioned a police search for the VIN regardless of
whether Class stepped out of the car voluntarily or whether he was
ordered out by the police.
b. Dangers that would have been presented?
After suggesting that Class was partially to blame for the police
intrusion, the Court proceeded to analyze what it called the danger
that "would have been presented"' 199 by returning Class to his vehi-
cle to remove the papers that obscured the VIN. The Court noted
that police officers normally keep the driver of a vehicle in the car
during routine traffic stops. 200 Pennsylvania v. Mimms 20 1 established,
however, that the fourth amendment does not prohibit the police
from ordering a driver, lawfully stopped, to exit his vehicle.20 2 This
authority is granted "out of a concern for the safety of the police"
and because the additional intrusion on the detained motorist "can
only be described as de minimis." 20 3 Indeed, the Court in Class as-
serted that the fact that "while in the driver's seat, [Class] had a
loaded pistol at hand" illustrates one of the principal justifications
for the authority granted to the police by Mimms. 20 4 Consequently,
[t]o have returned [Class] immediately to the automobile would have
placed the officers in the same situation that the holding in Mimms al-
lows officers to avoid-permitting an individual being detained to have
possible access to a dangerous weapon and the benefit of the partial
concealment provided by the car's exterior. In light of the danger to
the officers' safety that would have been presented by returning
[Class] immediately to his car, we think the search to obtain the VIN
was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
20 5
This logic has appeal. Surely it makes no sense to return a sus-
pect to his vehicle where there exists a weapon which could be used
against the police officer. In addition, if Mimms grants police officers
the power to order motorists out of their vehicles, then requiring
199 106 S. Ct. at 967.
200 Id. at 967 (citing D. ScHuTrrTz & D. HuNT, TRAFFIC INVESTIGATION AND ENFORCE-
MENT 17 (1983)).
201 434 U.S. 106 (1977)(per curiam).
202 Id. at 111.
203 Id.
204 106 S. Ct. at 967.
205 Id.
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Officer McNamee to have returned Class to his car to move the pa-
per obscuring the VIN certainly seems like an unreasonable result.
As was argued by the state, this result would have substantially un-
dercut the "sound rule of Mimms." 206 Despite its initial attraction,
however, the state's argument and the Class majority's adaptation of
it will not stand close scrutiny.
Undoubtedly, the Court has been keenly aware of the hazards
associated with police-citizen encounters and has given attention to
the possible dangers related to the stopping of motorists by po-
lice.20 7 Until the Class decision, however, the Court had always been
careful to require that there be some showing of objective criteria or
justification before the police are allowed to intrude into constitu-
tionally protected areas in the name of "officer safety." The re-
quirement that officers possess some modicum of objective cause
before intruding into constitutionally protected areas is, of course,
necessary to prevent the "standardless and unconstrained discre-
tion" 208 that lies at the heart of the fourth amendment's protection
against unreasonable police intrusions. Michigan v. Long
20 9 illus-
trates this principle. In Long, two deputies observed the defendant's
car traveling fast and erratically. The deputies stopped the vehicle.
After Long exited his vehicle and failed to produce his vehicle regis-
tration, the deputies sensed that Long" 'appeared to be under the
influence of something.' "210 As Long headed for his vehicle, appar-
ently to retrieve his registration, the deputies followed him and ob-
served a large hunting knife in plain view in the car. Long was then
subjected to a Terry protective frisk, and the interior of his vehicle
was searched for other weapons. As a result of this search, mari-
juana was discovered and seized by the deputies.
In upholding the search of Long's vehicle, Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court explained that a search of the passenger com-
partment of an automobile is "permissible if the police officer pos-
sesses a reasonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, rea-
sonably warrant' the officers in believing that the suspect is danger-
ous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons." 21'
206 Brief for Petitioner at 27, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
207 See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5
(1973). Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1048; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148
n.3 (1972).
208 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
209 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
210 Id. at 1036 (quoting People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 469, 320 N.W.2d 866, 868
(1982)).
211 Id. at 1049 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 1052 n.16 ("[O]ur opinion clearly
19871
TRACEY MACLIN
Similarly, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,212 the Court held
that the fourth amendment prohibited roving border patrols from
conducting warrantless searches of automobiles near the interna-
tional border if such searches were not based on any probable
cause.213 As Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, explained, the
"Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the police in
indicates that the area search that we approve is limited to a search for weapons in circum-
stances where the officers have a reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous to
them.") (emphasis added).
212 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
213 Almeida-Sanchez was the first of the Court's modem border-search cases involving
automobiles. The defendant in Almeida-Sanchez had been convicted of having knowingly
received, concealed and facilitated the transportation of a large quantity of marijuana.
In the Supreme Court, he contended that the search of his car, which occurred 25 miles
north of the Mexican border, was unconstitutional. It was undisputed that the border
patrol had no search warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion for stopping or
searching the defendant's vehicle. Id. at 268.
Rather than relying upon the automobile exception to the fourth amendment, the
government argued that the search of the defendant's car was permissible under the
Court's "administrative inspection cases." Id. at 270. The Court rejected this conten-
tion, noting that the search of the defendant's vehicle was "conducted in the unfettered
discretion of the members of the Border Patrol," and thus it "embodied precisely the
evil the Court saw in Camara [v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)] when it insisted
that the 'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant
prior to the inspection." 413 U.S. at 270 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33).
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the Court upheld the au-
thority of a roving border patrol to stop a vehicle near the Mexican border and question
its occupants when governmental agents possess a reasonable suspicion that the sus-
pected vehicle may contain illegal aliens. The case differed from Almeida-Sanchez because
the government did not claim the authority to search cars, but only to briefly question
the occupants about their citizenship and immigration status.
Although the Court upheld the authority of the border patrol to stop vehicles, the
Court was "unwilling to let the Border Patrol dispense entirely with the requirement
that officers must have a reasonable suspicion to justify roving-patrol stops." Id. at 882.
The Court stated:
To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without any suspi-
cion that a particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the resi-
dents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of
the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers .... Although we
may assume for purposes of this case that the broad congressional power over im-
migration authorizes Congress to admit aliens on conditions that they will submit to
reasonable questioning about their right to be and remain in the country, this
power cannot diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may be mis-
taken for aliens. For the same reasons that the Fourth Amendment forbids stop-
ping vehicles at random to inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the
country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their
citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.
Id. at 882, 884.
In United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), a companion case of Brignoni-Ponce,
the Court held that border agents may not search private vehicles without consent or
probable cause at traffic checkpoints-or their functional equivalents-removed from
the border. Id. at 896-97. The government sought to distinguish the search in Ortiz
from the search in Almeida-Sanchez by noting that an agent's "discretion in deciding
which car to search is limited by the location of the checkpoint," and "the circumstances
[Vol. 78
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searching automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there must
surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a
roving-patrol stop." Id. at 894.
While acknowledging the relevance of these differences in determining the constitu-
tionality of a checkpoint stop, the Court concluded that such distinctions did not make
any difference in judging the propriety of checkpoint searches. "The greater regularity
attending the stop does not mitigate the invasion of privacy that a search entails." Id. at
895. Furthermore, the Court remained unconvinced of the government's claim that a
checkpoint places sufficient limits on an agent's discretion to select cars for search. Not-
ing that only 3% of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint are searched, the Court
found that the agents exercised "a substantial degree of discretion in deciding which
cars to search." Id. at 896. Such a degree of discretion to search, the Court declared,
was "not consistent with the Fourth Amendment." Id.
The case of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), resolved an issue
left open in Ortiz, namely, whether the border patrol may stop a vehicle at a fixed check-
point for brief questioning even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehi-
cle contains illegal aliens. The Court concluded that such a stop was consistent with the
fourth amendment and "need not be authorized in advance by ajudicial warrant." Id. at
545.
The critical distinction between the checkpoint stop in Martinez-Fuerte, and the
search in Ortiz and roving-patrol stops in Brignoni-Ponce, was the lesser intrusion upon
the motorist's fourth amendment interests inherent in the Martinez-Fuerte procedure:
[In checkpoint stops, n]either the vehicle nor its occupants are searched, and visual
inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can be seen without a search. This objec-
tive intrusion-the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection-also ex-
isted in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light
because the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on the
part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop.
Id. at 558. See also United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588-589
(1983)("The difference in outcome between the roving patrol stop in Brignoni-Ponce and
the fixed checkpoint stop in Martinez-Fuerte, was due in part to what the Court deemed
the less intrusive and less awesome nature of fixed checkpoint stops when compared to
roving patrol stops."); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656.
Moreover, the Court in Martinez-Fuerte also found that vehicle stops at checkpoints
do not involve unfettered enforcement authority by officers in the field:
[C]heckpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary en-
forcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are
operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are
duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed
checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for mak-
ing overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement re-
sources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class. And since field
officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abu-
sive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol
stops.
428 U.S. at 559.
As all of the above cases plainly demonstrate, the Court has refused to sanction any
type of stop or search of a vehicle based on the unsubstantiated hunch of a government
official. Rather, the Court has required that "any stop or search requires probable
cause, reasonable suspicion, or another discretion-limiting feature such as the use of
fixed checkpoints instead of roving patrols." United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. 579, 599 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In another border case not involving a vehicle, the Court decided that the fourth
amendment is not violated when custom officials, acting pursuant to a Congressional
statute and without a warrant or any suspicion of wrongdoing, boarded for inspection of
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be probable cause for the search. ' 214 A contrary rule would permit
the border patrol to exercise "unfettered discretion"2 15 in deciding
which vehicles would be subject to a thorough police search.
The result in Pennsylvania v. Mimms did not undercut this princi-
ple of a probable cause requirement for automobile searches. The
Mimms Court upheld the practice of a Philadelphia patrol officer "to
order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever
they had been stopped for a traffic violation." 216 The holding in
Mimms, however, could not support the conduct of Officer Mc-
Namee for several reasons. First, the police intrusion in Mimms-
the ordering of the motorist out of his vehicle-was justified at its
inception by a compelling state interest, namely the safety of the
officer. Due to the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he ap-
proaches a person seated in an automobile,"2 1 7 it was clear beyond
any doubt that the state's interest was both "legitimate and
weighty." 218 In contrast, the intrusion by Officer McNamee was not
justified at its inception by a similar compelling state interest.219 In-
deed, Officer McNamee's only reason for the search was the fact that
Class had committed an ordinary traffic infraction, an offense which
justified a temporary detention, not a search.220
Second, the intrusion involved in Mimms was limited in its scope
to the "circumstances which justified the interference in the first
documents a vessel that was located in waters providing ready access to the open sea.
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983). In United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3311 (1985), the Court ruled that the prolonged deten-
tion of a traveler at the international border, "beyond the scope of a routine customs
search and inspection," is permissible where customs agents, considering all the facts
surrounding the traveler and her trip, "reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling
contraband in her alimentary canal."
214 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 269.
215 Id. at 270.
216 434 U.S. at 110.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 973 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the situation
in Mimms, the intrusion in this case-the search of [Class'] vehicle-did not directly
serve officer safety.... [The Court forgets that the police, with no reason to search the
interior, had no reason to return [Class] to his car. Thus, the state's interest in protecting
officer safety cannot validate the search.")(emphases in original); People v. Class, 63
N.Y.2d at 496,472 N.E.2d at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 184 ("The facts reveal no reason for
the officer to suspect other criminal activity or to act to protect his own safety.")(emphasis
added); see also Brief for Respondent at 32, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960
(1986)("This Court rightfully does not equate the ordinary law enforcement concerns
present here-the discovery of the VIN for the purpose of enforcing a regulatory
scheme or, at most, to recover stolen vehicles-with the imperative of protecting of a
police officer or the public from a possibly armed suspect.").
220 See infra notes 365-70 and accompanying text.
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place." 221 The same could not be said about Officer McNamee's
intrusion because he had no legitimate justification for it. More-
over, Officer McNamee's action was taken without any consideration
of the necessity of his intrusion.222 The officer did not bother to
check Class' documents before proceeding with his search. His
search was not the "least intrusive means reasonably available;
'223
thus, it should not be compared with the stop in Mimms where "the
officer lacked any less intrusive means to ensure his safety."
224
Finally, the most important point distinguishing the intrusion in
Class from the intrusion in Mimms is the constitutional distinction
between a search and a seizure. Generally speaking, the Court has
been careful to recognize that "[d]ifferent interests are implicated
by a seizure than by a search. '225 A seizure affects a person's pos-
sessory interests when police seize personal property226 and impli-
cates a person's liberty interests when police interrupt one's
freedom of movement. 227 A search, on the other hand, affects a per-
son's privacy interests. 228 In light of these differences, the Court
has tended to recognize the less intrusive nature of a seizure as com-
pared to a search.229 In Mimms, the Court weighed "the intrusion
into the driver's personal liberty occasioned not by the initial stop of
the vehicle, which was admittedly justified, but by the order to get
out of the car." 23 0 The Court found that this "additional intrusion
[could] only be described as de minimis. The driver [was] asked to
221 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
222 As noted above, Officer McNamee sought the VIN without bothering to check the
documents Class had brought with him as he exited his vehicle. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
223 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)(plurality opinion). For further discus-
sion of the "least intrusive means" test, see infra note 313.
224 Brief for Respondent at 32, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
225 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984)(plurality opinion). See also
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969); discussion supra notes 144-46 and
accompanying text.
226 See United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1983); see also, United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 728 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("It must be recognized that whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person.").
228 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715-17 (1984); id. at 729-31 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1983).
229 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984)(plurality opinion); Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983)(Stevens, J., concurring in thejudgment); United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-14 n.8 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51
(1970). Cf. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); discussion supra note 213
(contrasting the fourth amendment interests implicated at a checkpoint stop with the
privacy interests affected by a search at a checkpoint).
230 434 U.S. at 111.
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expose to view very little more of his person than [was] already ex-
posed." 231 Hence, the police intrusion in Mimms did not constitute
an invasion of privacy.
The circumstances in Class, in stark contrast to the seizure in
Mimms, involved a search of a constitutionally protected area. The
Class police intrusion went beyond the "mere inconvenience" in-
volved in Mimms; it represented an injection of official scrutiny into
an area over which the police had no authority. Moreover, the po-
lice intrusion in Class exposed an area of privacy that was not other-
wise visible. Because this was a constitutionally protected area,
Class held a reasonable expectation that his privacy would not be
invaded unless the police possessed probable cause to believe his
vehicle was carrying contraband or evidence of criminal activity.
232
Unlike the situation in Mimms, where the police seizure affected no
constitutionally protected area or interest,23 3 the search in Class in-
fringed Class' right to be free from official scrutiny absent the prob-
able cause needed to support a search.
Accordingly, the majority's reliance on Mimms and its discussion
about the danger that would have been presented by returning
Class to his vehicle was not only unpersuasive in light of the signifi-
cant constitutional differences between the seizure upheld in Mimms
and the search challenged in Class, but it was also irrelevant. The
Court's analysis begged the question whether Officer McNamee had
any objective justification for his search in the first place.
2. Struggling to balance prior precedents
Following its preliminary comments on the blameworthiness of
Class' conduct and the dangers of returning him to his vehicle, the
Court shifted into a substantive discussion of whether Officer Mc-
Namee's search was "reasonable" under the Terry balancing
formula.2 34 The majority relied on Mimms and Michigan v. Summers
231 Id.
232 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
233 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection."). But cf. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 120-124 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)(motorists stopped for traffic violations retain an interest in not being required to
obey an arbitrary command).
234 After setting forth Terry's well-known standard for determining the reasonableness
of a challenged search or seizure, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, and reaffirming that "this test
generally means that searches must be conducted pursuant to a warrant backed by prob-
able cause," Class, 106 S. Ct. at 967 (citations omitted), the Class majority made the
following observation: "When a search or seizure has as its immediate object a search
for a weapon, however, we have struck the balance to allow the weighty interest in the
safety of police officers to justify warrantless searches based on a reasonable suspicion of
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in enumerating three factors present in those cases which supported
its conclusion that the search of Class' vehicle was permissible. The
Court argued that the following three factors, which justified utiliza-
tion of Teny's balancing formula in Mimms and Summers, were also
present in Class: 1) the safety of the officers was served by the gov-
ernmental intrusion; 2) the intrusion was minimal; and 3) the search
stemmed from some probable cause 235 focusing suspicion on the
criminal activity." Id. at 967-68 (citing Terry and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972)). With all due respect, the majority's formulation of the Terry standard is some-
what misleading. By its phraseology, the Court implies a search for a weapon is permis-
sible where there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The crux of the Teny
case, however, was not whether the warrantless police search of Terry was reasonable
based merely on "a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity," Class, 106 S. Ct. at 968,
"but rather, whether there was sufficient justification for [the] invasion of Terry's per-
sonal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation." Terry,
392 U.S. at 23. The Terry Court expressly found that such justification is demonstrated
only where the officer has "reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dan-
gerous individual." Id. at 27; see also id. at 24, 30; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146
(1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968). Thus, a "reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity" is not enough to justify an officer's search of a person for a weapon.
Instead, an officer is permitted to conduct a patdown frisk to search for weapons only
when he possesses a reasonable suspicion that the suspect he is confronting is armed
and dangerous. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) ("The 'narrow scope' of
the Teny exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or
suspicion directed at the person to be frisked."); LaFave, supra note 143, at 87 (not all
Terry-type stops call for a patdown frisk for weapons).
235 What the Court meant by its statement that "the search stemmed from some prob-
able cause focusing suspicion on the individual affected by the search" is not clear. Class,
106 S. Ct. at 968 (emphasis added). Probable cause cannot be created out of thin air.
Probable cause to stop is one thing; probable cause to search is a wholly different mat-
ter. Undoubtedly, the officers had probable cause to stop Class in light of their observa-
tion of his committing two traffic infractions. The possession of probable cause to stop a
vehicle, however, cannot work as a bootstrap to also provide probable cause to search
the vehicle where the police have no reason to suspect that the car was stolen, that it
contained contraband, or that the motorist had committed an offense other than the
traffic violations.
This principle was reaffirmed in a different context in Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct.
1149, 1153 (1987). The Hicks Court explained that, though police may have a legitimate
justification for one type of intrusion, any additional intrusion that is unrelated to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion must be supported by an independent legal justifi-
cation. Thus, a valid police entry prompted by the need to search for a person or weap-
ons did not also provide legal cause to examine suspicious-looking stereo equipment in
order to read and record the serial numbers. Cf. State v. Doe, 115 N.H. 682, 685, 371
A.2d 167, 169 (1975):
[P]robable cause to search is not the same as probable cause to arrest. Probable
cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowl-
edge or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a man of
ordinary caution in the belief that the arrestee has committed or is committing a
crime. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963). But the right to search is not
dependent upon the right to arrest. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158
(1925). Probable cause to search exists if the man of ordinary caution would be
justified in believing that what is sought will be found in the place to be searched...
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individual affected by the search.23 6
The conclusion that Officer McNamee's search was constitu-
tionally reasonable is not supported by the Court's prior prece-
dents. First, it is clear that Michigan v. Summers provides no basis for
the Class result. Furthermore, the conclusion that the police inva-
sion of Class' car was minimally intrusive does not explain why the
search was constitutional, despite an absence of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion warranting the search. Finally, Mimms offers
no foundation upon which the result in Class can rest. The tempo-
rary detention upheld in Mimms was qualitatively different from the
search approved in Class. Indeed, even a cursory reading of Mimms
and Summers reveals that the majority's analysis is not only far from
''conventional," but also is without basis even under the broadest
reading of the Court's prior cases.
237
a. Summers does not support the Class result
Summers,238 unlike Class, focused on the constitutionality of the
police detaining, rather than searching, the occupant of a house
and that what is sought, if not contraband or fruits or implements of crime, will
"aid in a particular apprehension or conviction."
See also 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 34, § 3.1(b) at 544-48. But cf. id., § 2.5(d) at 457 ("Mhe
Class majority reasoned that such cases as Mimms and Michigan v. Summers showed that
certain police action undertaken in the interest of self-protection could be 'piggy-
backed' onto some other police action (a traffic stop in Mimms, execution of a search
warrant in Summers) grounded in probable cause (albeit not probable cause the person
was armed).").
Perhaps the Class Court was intimating that probable cause for a stop also provided
a lesser level of probable cause to search, where the object of the search is related to the
administrative function surrounding the search. The Court's administrative search
cases, however, provide no support for this novel theory of fourth amendment jurispru-
dence. See infra notes 328-57 and accompanying text.
236 Justice O'Connor utilized the Summers decision on a prior occasion to determine
whether certain law enforcement interests are sufficiently substantial to justify a warrant-
less police intrusion on less than probable cause. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983), Justice O'Connor noted three different law enforcement interests identified by
the Summers Court which justified limited detention of the occupants of a home during
execution of a valid search warrant. They were: 1) preventing flight should incriminat-
ing evidence be found; 2) minimizing the risk of harm both to the police and the occu-
pants; and 3) orderly completion of the search. Id. at 704. Accordingly, Justice
O'Connor concluded that "a generalized interest in law enforcement [could] justify an
intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of probable
cause" and even where there was no "special law enforcement interest such as officer
safety." Id. at 703.
237 But cf. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 969 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The Court has answered
correctly the Fourth Amendment question presented in this case by applying conven-
tional Fourth Amendment analysis.").
238 In Summers, the Court held that "a warrant to search for contraband founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of
the premises while a proper search is conducted." 452 U.S. at 705.
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while they executed a warrant to search the premises for contra-
band.23 9 Indeed, Justice Stevens' opinion in Summers was careful to
emphasize that the seizure issue before the Court was unlike the
search issue resolved in Ybarra v. Illinois.240 In Ybarra,24 1 police who
were executing a warrant to search a public tavern and its bartender
for illegal drugs detained and searched all the customers present in
the tavern. A search of Ybarra revealed a cigarette pack containing
heroin. The Court ruled that the search was unconstitutional be-
cause the police had no particular reason to suspect that Ybarra was
connected with illicit drugs and no basis for believing he was armed
and dangerous.2 42 Ybarra did not address the constitutionality of
the detention of the defendant or any of the customers inside the
tavern. 243 Summers, in contrast, involved the constitutionality of de-
taining an occupant of premises subject to a valid search warrant
while it is being executed.2 44
Furthermore, under the Terry balancing formula, it is clear that
the possession by the police of a valid search warrant was of "prime
importance" in assessing the competing interests at stake in Sum-
mers.245 The police in Class did not possess a valid search warrant,
and they did not have probable cause to believe that Class' vehicle
was associated with criminal conduct or that it contained contra-
band. Moreover, the Summers Court also thought it "appropriate to
consider the nature of the articulable and individualized suspi-
cion" 246 upon which the police detention was supported. In Sum-
mers, this suspicion arose from the nexus of an occupant to the home
239 Id. at 694 ("The dispositive question in this case is whether the initial detention of
respondent violated his constitutional right to be secure against an unreasonable seizure
of his person.") (emphasis added).
240 Id. at 695 n.4.
241 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
242 Id. at 90-93.
243 Ybarra also did not address the situation "where the warrant itself authorizes the
search of unnamed persons in a place and is supported by probable cause to believe that
persons who will be in the place at the time of the search will be in possession of [contra-
band]." Id. at 92 n.4.
244 452 U.S. at 705. Later in his opinion in Summers, Justice Stevens noted the consti-
tutional differences between a stop and a search of a vehicle in the context of the gov-
ernment's interest in controlling the flow of illegal aliens crossing the Mexican border:
The detention approved in Brignoni-Ponce did not encompass a search of the vehicle.
The Court had held in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), that
such a search must be supported by probable cause. In United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), the Court held that stops at permanent checkpoints
involved even less intrusion to a motorist than the detention by the roving patrol,
and thus a stop at such a checkpoint need not even be based on any individualized
suspicion.
452 U.S. at 699 n.10.
245 Id. at 701.
246 Id. at 703.
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that is the subject of a valid search warrant. 247 The existence of the
warrant provided an "objective justification" for the detention. In
Class, there was no such justification to support Officer McNamee's
search, and the police had no objective cause to search for the
VIN.
2 48
The Court noted in Summers that the police intrusion there
"minimiz[ed] the risk of harm to the officers" and was "surely less
intrusive than the search itself."' 249 It is, however, a misreading of
the Summers opinion to suggest that either of these two factors were
significant in the Court's application of the Teny balancing test. In-
deed, the Court in Summers sought to refrain from any multifarious
balancing test; the Court announced that it was establishing a cate-
gorical rule instead of an ad hoc, case-by-case test to be applied by
an officer in the field.
250
Although the Court's reading of Summers is regrettable, Class ex-
tends the rationale of Summers even further by implicitly sanctioning
an arbitrary police search during a routine traffic stop. This exten-
sion is specifically rejected in Summers.251 Justice O'Connor, trying
to establish justification for Officer McNamee's search, focused on
the fact that the search "stemmed from some probable cause focus-
ing suspicion on the individual affected by the search." 252 Accord-
ing to Justice O'Connor, "the officer's probable cause stemmed
from directly observing [Class] commit a violation of the law."
253
Unless Justice O'Connor intended to hold that the vehicles of all
motorists stopped for routine traffic violations are subject to search
at the whim of police officers, then, as Justice Brennan noted, "[t]his
247 Id. at 703-04 (footnote omitted):
A judicial officer has determined that police have probable cause to believe that
someone in the home is committing a crime. Thus a neutral magistrate rather than
an officer in the field has made the critical determination that the police should be
given a special authorization to thrust themselves into the privacy of a home. The
connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable
and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a deten-
tion of that occupant.
248 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 971 (Brennan, J., dissenting)("The police had no justification
whatever, let alone probable cause, to search for the VIN.")(emphasis in original).
249 Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-702.
250 Id. at 705 n.19. See also 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 34, § 4.9(e) at 309; Mertens, supra
note 23, at 603.
251 See Wasserstrom, supra note 23, at 355 ("Although the [Summers] Court had ex-
panded the range of police conduct which is exempt from the warrant requirement, the
Court had not left police with unfettered discretion. Rather, the Court required police
officers to comply with workable rules and to justify searches and seizures by some quan-
tum of evidence.").
252 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 968.
253 Id.
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analysis makes a mockery of the fourth amendment. ' '254
The Class majority's reasoning undermines fourth amendment
protections because it permits an officer to search the interior of a
stopped vehicle to discover the VIN, a motorist's driver's license, a
registration certificate, or an insurance card without ever identifying
any specific and articulable objective criteria that warrants such an
intrusion. Undoubtedly, the commission of a traffic offense permits
the police to stop a motorist and demand some form of identifica-
tion. 255 A valid stop, of course, allows the police to seize any items
of contraband or evidence of crime located in plain view.256 Such a
stop also affords an officer the opportunity to observe the public
appearance of a motorist and his vehicle, including the VIN when it
is visible from outside of the car. A routine stop, however, cannot
provide the necessary probable cause to search the interior of a ve-
hicle when the police are unable to articulate any objective reasons
for doing so. "Probable cause" is not something an officer keeps in
his hip pocket readily available should the officer decide he needs it
to support a search. On the contrary, probable cause to search ex-
ists where an officer has good reason to believe that contraband or
criminal evidence is located in a particular place.
257
In contrast to the unpersuasive efforts of the Class majority to
justify Officer McNamee's search, the Summers Court was alert to the
dangers of unchecked police authority and post hoc judicial ratio-
nalizations validating such authority. The constitutional rule ap-
proved by Justice Stevens did not depend upon an ad hoc
determination because the officer in the field was "not required to
evaluate the quantum of proofjustifying detention or the extent of
the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure." 258 As Professor Was-
serstrom has pointed out, the Summers Court sought to apply the
Terry balancing test in a categorical manner. 2
59
Justice O'Connor's post hoc rationalizations about the reasona-
bleness of Officer McNamee's conduct do not measure up to the
"workable rules" 260 of Summers. Her opinion articulated no clear
checks on the authority of police to search the interior of a vehicle
during a routine stop. Justice O'Connor contended that the "partic-
ular method of obtaining the VIN here was justified by a concern for
254 Id. at 972 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
256 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736 (1983)(plurality opinion); id. at 749,50 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in the judgment).
257 See supra, note 235.
258 Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.19.
259 Wasserstrom, supra note 23, at 355. See also Mertens, supra note 23, at 594-95.
260 Wasserstrom, supra note 23, at 355.
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the officer's safety." 261 This assertion is remarkable. There was
nothing in the record to indicate that Officer McNamee's intrusion
was predicated on a concern for his own or anyone else's safety.
262
Officer McNamee entered Class' vehicle because he had a hunch
that it might be stolen. If the facts of Class can justify a search of a
vehicle's interior in the name of "police safety," then it is hard to
imagine that a similar search of a motorist's purse or glove compart-
ment for a driver's license or registration certificate could not also
be justified under the same rationale.
263
b. Although the search was minimally intrusive, there still was no
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to support it
The Class majority also found that the search was minimally in-
trusive. Even accepting this fact, 2 6 4 the characterization of a search
as minimally intrusive does not explain why that search is constitu-
tional when the officer involved clearly lacked probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion to warrant the search. A police officer is not
permitted to search every person or automobile whom he en-
counters, even if the search is minimal.265 The fourth amendment's
261 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 968.
262 In the lower courts, the state never argued that a concern for the officers' safety
justified Officer McNamee's method for obtaining the VIN. Respondent's Brief in Ap-
pellate Division at 6-9; Respondent's Brief in Court of Appeals at 7-14. Also, the court
of appeals expressly found that the "facts reveal no reason for the officer to suspect
other criminal activity or to act to protect his own safety." 63 N.Y.2d at 496, 472 N.E.2d
at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 184. Finally, the state only devoted only one paragraph of its
fifty-page brief in the Supreme Court to argue that Officer McNamee's search served to
protect police safety. Brief for Petitioner at 26-27, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960
(1986).
263 State v. Byrd, 23 N.C. App. 718, 209 S.E.2d 516 (1974), illustrates the danger in
the Court's rationale. In Byrd, a state trooper decided to make a random check of Byrd's
driver's license and registration. Byrd produced a driver's license but failed to produce
a registration certificate. The officer then searched the vehicle's glove compartment and
discovered a pistol. The court held that this search was constitutional because "'[a]
traffic violation as such will justify a search for things related to it. So, for example, if the
operator is unable to produce proof of registration, the officer may search the car for
evidence of ownership ......."23 N.C. App. at 720, 209 S.E.2d at 517 (quoting State v.
Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 77, 232 A.2d 141, 143 (1967)). Although Byrd did not uphold the
officer's search in the name of "police safety," there is, after the Class decision, a prece-
dent available to justify a search of the type conducted in Byrd.
264 This proposition is not easily acceptable. Justice Brennan's dissent correctly
noted that although the search of Class' vehicle was not a "full-scale excavation," it was
nonetheless "substantially more intrusive than an ordinary traffic stop." Class, 106 S. Ct.
at 974 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Therefore, the extent of the search in Class failed the
Terry requirement that "the scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by'
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (quot-
ing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)(Fortas,J., concurring)).
265 See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968)("The police officer is not entitled
to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes
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prohibition of searches and seizures that are not supported by some
objective justification governs all police intrusions of a citizen's con-
stitutionally protected privacy.
266
Moreover, describing Officer McNamee's search as minimally
intrusive in this instance does not provide the police or the lower
courts with a standardized rule with which to judge the constitution-
ality of future searches under a variety of circumstances. 267 Sup-
pose, for example, a motorist, who is in the habit of keeping his
wallet underneath the floor mat of his car, is stopped and forgets to
bring it with him as he exits his vehicle.268 Would a police search
for the wallet (or a briefcase or pocketbook) be "minimally intru-
sive?" Would a search of the glove compartment under similar cir-
cumstances also be unobjectionable? If the officer observes or
detects something while inside the vehicle that would not be discov-
erable from outside, is this also an unobjectionable search? Is the
Court seriously willing to state that these searches are also "mini-
mally intrusive" and thus, constitutionally permissible in the context
of a routine traffic stop?
The Court's willingness to downplay the intrusiveness of the
search in Class does not provide law enforcement officials with a firm
rule to guide their future searches.269 At best, the Court's rationali-
zation encourages the police to take their chances when deciding
whether to embark on a search and to hope that a reviewing court
inquiries."); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1153 (1987)(Justice Scalia explain-
ing that "[a] search is a search even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a
turntable").
266 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980)(per curiam); Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 n.15.
267 See LaFave, supra note 99, at 141 ("My basic premise is that Fourth Amendment
doctrine ... is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and
thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the con-
text of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged.").
268 Of course, a motorist's failure to retrieve a wallet located underneath a seat or a
registration certificate placed in a glove compartment may not be due to inadvertence.
Often, drivers who have been stopped by the police are cautioned not to make any fur-
tive gestures which may appear to the police that the motorist has reached for a weapon.
Motorists are generally told that if they are stopped by the police, it is best to place both
hands on the steering wheel until instructed by an officer to do otherwise.
269 The Court did not address the propriety of Officer McNamee's opening the door
of Class' vehicle to locate the VIN plate. The reasoning and result in Class suggest that
the Court was not unduly concerned with that intrusion. 106 S. Ct. at 968 ("The VIN,
which was the clear initial objective of the officer, is by law present in one of two loca-
tions-either inside the doorjamb, or atop the dashboard and thus ordinarily in plain
view of someone outside the automobile. Neither of these locations is subject to a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.").
Notwithstanding the Court's casual treatment of Officer McNamee's opening of the
door, this action (opening a vehicle's door to examine a VIN on the doorjamb) should
not be quickly dismissed as action which does not constitute a "search." The appropri-
ate analysis of such conduct is provided by traditional fourth amendment doctrine.
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will later be persuaded that the officer's conduct was, under the cir-
cumstances, reasonable.270 At worst, the Class opinion "leaves po-
lice discretion utterly without limits" 2 7 1 and requires courts to
engage in an ad hoc balancing test, despite the absence of any proof
offered by the police to justify their invasion of a motorist's constitu-
tionally protected privacy.
c. The stop upheld in Mimms is easily distinguishable from the
search allowed in Class
The Class Court relied on Pennsylvania v. Mimms 2 72 in formulat-
ing its balancing test. As with the reasoning of Summers, the majority
utilized selected portions of Mimms that were helpful to achieve its
desired result, while ignoring other important points that did not
support the outcome reached in Class. Justice O'Connor's opinion
in Class stated that the government intrusion in both Class and
Mimms served the safety of the officers, was minimally intrusive, and
stemmed from some probable cause focusing suspicion on the indi-
vidual affected by the search. 273 The intrusion in Mimms was initi-
ated because of concerns for police safety, 274 and it was viewed by a
majority of that Court as not overly intrusive.275 In Class, however,
the record did not show that Officer McNamee's intrusion was set in
motion because of a perceived threat to his safety.
276
Where an officer's conduct (in opening the door) provides the officer with visual access
to items not otherwise visible, a search has occurred.
As explained in People v. Piper, 101 Ill. App. 3d. 296, 302, 427 N.E.2d 1361, 1364
(1981), where "the VIN can be seen by the policeman only when he himself has opened
the door to the vehicle, a search has begun." See also 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 34,
§ 2.5(d) at 457 ("[lit would seem that opening a vehicle door to see an otherwise hidden
VIN is likewise a search .. "). Cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1152-53 (1987)(po-
lice action, unrelated to valid intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the
premises or its contents did produce a new invasion of the suspect's privacy; "[a] search
is a search" even if it reveals only serial numbers).
Moreover, where there are no neutral criteria or articulable facts "which are to
guide police in deciding whether to open the doors of vehicles in search of [the] VIN,"
such a search is one conducted at the unbridled discretion of the police and, therefore, is
constitutionally impermissible. Piper, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 304, 427 N.E.2d at 1366.
270 Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949)(Jackson, J., dissent-
ing)("We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and seizure without
warrant which we sustain, the officers will interpret and apply themselves and will push
to the limit.").
271 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Class, 106
S. Ct. at 972 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272 434 U.S. 106 (1977)(per curiam).
273 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 968.
274 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110.
275 Id. at 111.
276 See supra note 219.
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Even if the Court's unsupported determination that Officer Mc-
Namee's search was initiated for reasons of safety is accepted, the
record was completely devoid of the specific and articulable facts
which are required by Michigan v. Long prior to searching a car in the
name of police safety. 277 The Court simply ignored the explicit re-
quirement of Long that an officer possess a reasonable belief that a
particular suspect is armed and potentially dangerous. The major-
ity's refusal to discuss the relevance of the holding in Long would be
tolerable if the entry for the inspection of the VIN in Class were con-
sidered by the majority to be incidental to, and not separate from,
the administrative and regulatory procedures associated with the
lawful stop.278 The Class majority, however, insisted on grounding
its holding upon the balancing formula of Teny. Therefore, the
Court's abandonment of Long's reasonable suspicion requirements
is indefensible and once again reveals what has become an obvious
"tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Teny decision into
a general statement that the Fourth Amendment requires only that
any [search] be reasonable. ' 279
The majority's willingness to find that the lawful stop of Class
for an ordinary traffic infraction provided sufficient "probable
cause" to justify an intrusion into Class' vehicle is also troubling.
Although there is certainly room for criticizing the Mimms deci-
sion,280 the fact remains that the police conduct in Class-a search of
the interior of an automobile based on nothing more than a routine
traffic stop-"plainly involves an intrusion qualitatively different
and more serious than that which occurred in Mimms. ' ' 28 1 The in-
trusion in Mimms involved the ordering of a motorist to exit from his
car after a permissible stop; this action represents an incremental
expansion of the already lawful seizure of a motorist.282 This addi-
tional intrusion required that the motorist "expose to view very lit-
277 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
278 Justice Powell's concurrence hints that he might be willing to sanction such a view.
106 S. Ct. at 969-70 (Powell,J., concurring). See also Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640
(1983), where the Court held that a warrantless inventory search of a shoulder bag car-
ried by an arrestee was permissible under the fourth amendment. "A so-called inven-
tory search is not an independent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative
step following arrest and preceding incarceration." Id. at 644.
279 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 721 (1983)(Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment).
280 See Mimms, 433 U.S. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281 Brief for Respondent at 33, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
282 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. The Court's inquiry focused not on the legality of the
intrusion "resulting from the request to stop the vehicle or from the later 'patdown,' but
on the incremental intrusion resulting from the request to get out of the car once the
vehicle was lawfully stopped." Id.
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tle more of his person than [was] already exposed." 283
In contrast to Mimms, however, the search of Class' vehicle was
fundamentally different from the initial stop of the vehicle in terms
of the level of intrusiveness and in terms of the probable cause pos-
sessed by police. The stopping of a vehicle after the observation of
a traffic violation is a routine police procedure. Although the mo-
torist's freedom of movement is interrupted, it is usually only a tem-
porary detention which is not unduly intrusive and which is justified
by the police observation of the traffic infraction. The search of
Class' vehicle, on the other hand, was qualitatively different from
such a routine traffic stop. As a general matter, "a search, even of
an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy." 28 4 Specifically,
the search of Class' vehicle was intrusive because it exposed hidden
areas that were subject to constitutional protection. Furthermore,
Class' vehicle was stopped only because the police had probable
cause to believe that Class was committing two traffic violations.
The police had no probable cause to search for the VIN, and noth-
ing suggested that the vehicle Class was driving was stolen or that
Class himself was involved in any criminal activity.
28 5
To claim that the probable cause which justified the stop of the
vehicle also justified the search not only "makes a mockery of the
Fourth Amendment," 28 6 but also grants the police unlimited au-
thority to scrutinize the interior of stopped cars whenever it is nec-
essary to do so as part of the administrative process surrounding
ordinary traffic stops. This grant of power is wholly unprecedented
and is unnecessary in light of the substantial authority afforded the
police in Michigan v. Long. The Class opinion provides no convincing
reason why this additional "power to scrutinize" is needed for rou-
tine traffic stops.
In its final passage, the Class majority explains the reasons why
Officer McNamee's search was constitutional. Obliquely relying on
its new "diligence and necessary" test for determining the constitu-
tionality of a Terry-type police intrusion, 28 7 the Court stated that the
283 Id. at 111.
284 United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975).
285 See Class, 106 S. Ct. at 963.
286 Id. at 972 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
287 In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985), the Court provided a full
statement of its new standard for judging the constitutionality of limited intrusions
based on less than probable cause. The Sharpe test is "[w]hether the police diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain [or search] the defendant." See also
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) ("in assessing the effect of the length of
the detention, we take into account whether the police diligently pursued their investiga-
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search of Class' vehicle "was focused in its objective [the officer was
diligent in carrying out his search] and no more intrusive than nec-
essary to fulfill that objective." 288 The majority noted that the
search was certainly far less intrusive than a formal arrest and
slightly more intrusive than having Class move the papers him-
self. 28 9 Officer McNamee did not "root about" the interior of the
vehicle, nor did he open any compartments or closed containers.
He "simply reached directly for the unprotected space where the
VIN was located to move the offending papers." 290 This search, the
Court declared, "was sufficiently unintrusive to be constitutionally
permissible in light of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy
tion"); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)(plurality opinion)("The scope of the
intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances
of each case. This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must be tempo-
rary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."); Michi-
gan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701 n.14 (quoting 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 54, § 9.2 at
40)("[t]he reasonableness of a detention may be determined in part by 'whether the
police are diligently pursuing a means of investigation which is likely to resolve the mat-
ter one way or another very soon.' ").
This new "diligence and necessary" standard enables the Court to release itself,
when necessary, from the first-prong of the stricter Teny test. Class illustrates this point.
Under the traditional two-step Terry inquiry for determining whether a particular search
or seizure was constitutionally reasonable, the initial inquiry of the Court would have
been whether the police intrusion was justified at its inception. Clearly, Officer Mc-
Namee's conduct cannot pass this requirement because he had no reasonable suspicion,
let alone probable cause, upon which to base his search of Class' vehicle. Under the
Court's new standard, however, this inquiry was never performed. Instead, the Court
focused on whether the police acted diligently in effectuating their intrusion, and
whether the means utilized by the police were necessary. This new formula thus evades
a central precept of fourth amendment doctrine: law enforcement officials must first be
able to discern a minimum quantum of facts before intruding upon an individual's
fourth amendment freedoms. Mertens, supra note 23, at 594-95.
The second inquiry of the Court under the Teny test is whether the police intrusion
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. In Terry, Detective McFadden's action was justi-
fied at its inception because he could point to specific and articulable facts which war-
ranted his belief that the suspects he was confronting were armed and dangerous.
Furthermore, the scope of Detective McFadden's intrusion was constitutionally valid be-
cause it was strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initia-
tion permissible-he searched only the outer surfaces of the suspects' clothing for
potential weapons that could be used against him. In Class, because Officer McNamee
had no objective cause to justify his intrusion at its inception, there is no need to assess
whether the scope of the intrusion was reasonably related to the circumstances which
justified the interference to begin with. In other words, in the absence of a legitimate
justification for his intrusion, Officer McNamee's search cannot be saved by claiming
that it was minimally intrusive.
For further discussion of the Court's "diligence and necessary" test, see infra notes
371-426 and accompanying text.





in the VIN and the fact that the officers observed [Class] commit two
traffic violations.- 291
The majority's reasoning cannot withstand analysis. Certainly,
the search was less intrusive than that which would have been al-
lowed had the police formally arrested Class. Stating the obvious,
however, does not explain why the search was constitutional despite
the officers' lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the
search.292
In the context of a formal arrest, police are permitted to search
the arrestee for any weapons he might use against an officer, as well
as any evidence or contraband in order to prevent its concealment
or destruction. 293 This authority to search a person incident to a
lawful arrest does not depend upon any degree of probability or
reasonable belief that the officer will find any weapons or criminal
evidence on the arrestee. Rather, this authority is based on the fact
that a lawful arrest has occurred; with "that intrusion being lawful, a
search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." 294
The rules governing a search incident to a lawful arrest, how-
ever, are not equally applicable to the "stricter Terry standards." 295
In the context of a Terry search, an officer must have a reasonable
basis to "believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime." 296 The Class Court's assertion that the
search was less intrusive than a formal arrest is meaningless when
one considers that Officer McNamee's search was more intrusive
than an ordinary automobile stop. In the 1979 case of Delaware v.
291 Id. at 968-69.
292 Of course, before police can make a formal arrest they must have probable cause
to arrest the suspect. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976). In Class there
was nothing in the record that indicated the police had planned to arrest Class for the
traffic infractions he had allegedly committed. Indeed, he was eventually arrested only
for possession of the gun; he was issued summonses for driving without a license and for
driving with a cracked windshield. Brief for Respondent at 3, New York v. Class, 106 S.
Ct. 960 (1986).
293 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
294 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). As Professor LaFave has
noted, Robinson described the authority of the police to search incident to a lawful arrest
in "absolute terms." LaFave, supra note 99, at 131.
295 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234. See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 n.14
(1983). Moreover, it is "axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest and
serve as part of its justification." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968). Thus, the
search incident to arrest doctrine is plainly inappropriate in Class. Brief for Respondent
at 8, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986)("[T]he doctrine is simply inapplicable in a
case where, as here, the officers merely stop a motorist for an ordinary traffic infraction
and make the arrest only after conducting their search and based solely on the evidence
seized as a result of that search.").
296 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
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Prouse,2 9 7 the Court held that an ordinary automobile stop is permis-
sible only on the basis of some objective justification or pursuant to
neutral criteria embodied in standard police procedures.
The Class Court also stated that the officer did not "root about"
the interior of the car or look into any compartments or containers.
Why this fact was important or relevant to the constitutional inquiry
is not readily apparent. It likewise could be asserted that the war-
rantless intrusion by the police into a home owner's garage to look
for his automobile is permissible because the police did not "root
about" the interior of the garage or open any closed containers
while in the garage.
Officer McNamee did not conduct an extensive examination of
Class' vehicle for the simple reason that there was no reason to do
so. A focused search was sufficient. Had he conducted a full-scale
search of the car, it is safe to assume the Court would have carefully
scrutinized his reasons for doing so. The fact remains, however,
that the officer's search did expose hidden areas of the vehicle. By
emphasizing that the officer could have conducted a far greater
search, the majority manages to avoid addressing the central ques-
tion in Class: whatjustification, if any, did Officer McNamee have for
conducting his concedely self-limited search in the first place?
Finally, the Court concludes that "this search was sufficiently
unintrusive to be constitutionally permissible in light of the lack of a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN and the fact that the
officers observed [Class] commit two traffic violations." 298 Such
reasoning does not provide a principled basis to resolve the fourth
amendment questions presented. Rather, this conclusion is no
more than a restatement of the view that, whenever there is a legal
stop for a traffic violation, police may search a motorist's vehicle for
the VIN or any other item in which a motorist has no expectation of
privacy provided that it is associated with the government's regula-
tion of automobiles. This open-ended assertion provides no basis
for concluding that a police search of a vehicle is constitutionally
permissible in the absence of either probable cause, reasonable sus-
picion or another discretion-limiting device.
297 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Recently, the Court turned down a request to consider the
constitutionality of stopping a motorist at a sobriety checkpoint, pursuant to internal
police procedures, where the police have no particular suspicion prior to the stop that
the motorist was under the influence of alcohol. Lowe v. Virginia, 230 Va. 346, 337
S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986).
298 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 968-69.
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3. The Class holding ignored the central requirement of Terry
As the above discussion indicates, the holding in Class was
clearly incongruent with the Court's prior holdings. Furthermore,
the Class opinion was contrary to the doctrinal basis of Terry and its
progeny because it completely ignored Terry's central requirement
that police intrusions which implicate fourth amendment freedoms
must be warranted at their inception by some quantum of objective
justification.
In order to guard against the dangers of unchecked police dis-
cretion, Terry established a two-step inquiry to determine the consti-
tutional "reasonableness" of searches and seizures which are based
on less than probable cause and which are conducted without ajudi-
cial warrant: "[I]n determining whether the seizure and search were
'unreasonable' our inquiry is a dual one-whether the officer's ac-
tion was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably re-
lated in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place." 299 In Terry, the Court explained that the first
prong of its balancing formula requires that, in justifying a particu-
lar intrusion, a "police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 30 0 In other words,
an officer must possess adequate objective criteria to justify an intru-
sion upon an individual's fourth amendment freedoms.
The purpose behind this requirement is significant. Unchecked
police discretion was the primary evil which motivated the adoption
of the fourth amendment.30' Through its warrant procedure, the
fourth amendment safeguards the liberty of citizens by requiring
that government officials obtain, from a neutral and detached magis-
trate, a warrant based on probable cause, specifying the place to be
searched or persons or things to be seized.30 2 Terry, however, dealt
with an area of police conduct which historically and practically
could not be subjected to the warrant process.303 The Court, there-
fore, had to create some discretion-limiting device to guard against
unrestrained police authority. Police officers conducting warrant-
299 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
300 Id. at 21.
301 See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and
Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases,
83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1369-72 (1983).
302 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
303 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. See Mertens, supra note 23, at 585; Wasserstrom, supra note
23, at 352.
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less searches and seizures on less than probable cause would have to
justify those intrusions by pointing to objective facts that warranted
the intrusion; inarticulate hunches or unsubstantiated facts would
not suffice. To reinforce this principle, the officer's allegations and
judgment would also be subject to the review of a neutral and de-
tached judge who would "evaluate the reasonableness of a particu-
lar search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.
°30 4
The judge's assessment of the officer's conduct, in turn, would be
measured by an objective rather than subjective test.
Consequently, a "police officer is not entitled to seize and
search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he
makes inquiries. ' 30 5 A contrary rule would expose the public to the
risk of arbitrary harassment. AsJustice Stevens has noted, "to elimi-
nate any requirement that an officer be able to explain the reasons
for his actions signals an abandonment of effective judicial supervi-
sion of [police intrusions] and leaves police discretion utterly with-
out limits." 3
06
The inherent danger of unchecked police discretion is the po-
tential for arbitrary or discriminatory exercise of police authority.
In the context of on-the-street stops which are conducted without
adequate checks, persons could be detained and questioned on
nothing more than an officer's bald assertion that an individual
"looked suspicious. °30 7 In other situations, absent sufficient re-
straints, law enforcement personnel would be free to effectuate
seizures of persons pursuant to so-called official "profiles."
308
These seizures would probably include a few criminals in their num-
bers but, more importantly, would also subject a large number of
innocent persons to substantial intrusions on little more than the
inchoate determinations of an officer in the field.3 0 9 In its most of-
304 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
305 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
306 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
307 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
308 For a discussion of the use of drug courier profiles, see Cloud, Search and Seizure by
the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile andJudicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 843 (1985).
309 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3319 (1985)(Bren-
nan, J., dissenting)(The number of highly intensive border searches of innocent travel-
lers is high. "One physician who at the request of custom officials conducted many
'internal searches'---rectal and vaginal examinations and stomach pumping-estimated
that he had found contraband in only 15 to 20 percent of the persons he examined. It
has similarly been estimated that only 16 percent of women subjected to body cavity
searches at the border were in fact found to be carrying contraband.") (footnotes omit-
ted); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)(per curiam); United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 571-573 (1980)(White, J., dissenting). For a cogent review of
Mendenhall and its reliance on "drug courier" profiles, see Kamisar, The Fourth Amend-
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fensive form, unfettered police discretion would encourage officers
to wield their authority based on individual values and prejudices.
Under such a regime, the police could stop or search a citizen where
they did not like "the cut of his jib"310 or the pace of his strut.
Other individuals could be held and questioned based on their place
of residence or the color of their skin. 311 Some individuals would,
of course, be spared police attention entirely. Therefore, to prevent
this type of arbitrary police behavior and to safeguard the privacy
and possessory interests of all citizens, the Court has required that
an officer, at the very least, have constitutionally sufficient and rea-
sonable grounds on which to base an invasion of an individual's
fourth amendment interests.
The second prong of the Teny balancing formula concerned
whether the police intrusion was "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." 31
2
In order to satisfy this criterion, it is incumbent that the scope of the
police invasion be no more intrusive than is absolutely necessary
and closely related to the purposes which justified its inception.313
ment, in THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-82, supra note 165, at
131-43.
310 Terry, 392 U.S. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
311 See LaFave, supra note 143, at 59; Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial
Control of the Police), 58J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 433, 452 (1967).
312 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
313 This requirement is better known as the "least intrusive means" test. The con-
cept, first articulated in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)(plurality opin-
ion)("the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short time"), no longer
appears to have the support of a majority of the Court, including the author of the rule,
Justice White. In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), an investigative deten-
tion case, a majority of the Court (including Justice White) dismissed the notion that
judges should inquire into whether alternative, less intrusive methods were available to
an officer conducting a Terry investigative stop or search.
A court making this assignment should take care to consider whether the police
are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not
indulge in unrealistic second-guessing .... A creative judge engaged in post hoc
evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by
which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But "[tihe fact
that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by
'less intrusive' means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable." Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 557 n.12 (1976). The question is not simply whether some other
alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to
recognize or to pursue it.
470 U.S. at 686-87. See also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304,
3311-12 (1985).
Justice Marshall's concurrence in Sharpe criticized the majority's apparent abandon-
ment of the "least intrusive means" requirement, but assumed that the rule in Royer
remained the law and that the "Court's mere quotation out of context of Cady, unsup-
ported by any legal argument or reasoned discussion, [was] not meant to overrule
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This limitation, as well as the requirement that an officer have objec-
tive justification for his initial intrusion, was designed to afford a
police officer the flexibility to protect himself while investigating
those suspected of criminal activity, while at the same time ensuring
that the fourth amendment rights of citizens are not trampled by
unduly intrusive and coercive police practices. Hence, this second
requirement also serves to check police discretion.
The majority in Class totally disregards the constitutional de-
mands established in Terry. Officer McNamee had absolutely no ob-
jective justification for the initiation of his intrusion into Class'
vehicle, and no amount of distortion of the record can change this
Royer." 470 U.S. at 694 n.6 (Marshall,J., concurring). Justice Brennan was less sanguine
about the continued viability of the Royer requirement. In his view, the Sharpe majority
"evaded the plain requirement[]" of Royer that the government demonstrate that "the
least intrusive means reasonably available" were used in effectuating a Terry stop. 470
U.S. at 718 (BrennanJ., dissenting).
In light of Sharpe, commentators might be forced to revise their assessments of the
Court's continued support of the "least intrusive means" requirement. Professor Mer-
tens, prior to Sharpe, had pointed out that, despite statements to the contrary in Illinois
v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1983)(involving an administrative search) and Mich-
igan v. Long 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983)(involving police safety), the Court still
appeared to support the "least intrusive means" requirement "as a limit on police inves-
tigative practices." Mertens, supra note 23, at 618 n.301 (emphasis in original). Sharpe
casts considerable doubt on Professor Mertens' laudable efforts to retain the application
of the "least intrusive means" rule as a limit on police investigative procedures.
Professor LaFave, anticipating Sharpe's objections to the Royer holding, has criticized
the rule because it is "particularly likely to result in second-guessing of police decisions
on how to proceed during a Teny stop." LaFave, "Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions
of the Person to Resolve Warrant, Grounds and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 418, 435
(1984). Professor LaFave supported the rule in cases like Michigan v. Long where there is
an "obvious alternative" to the intrusion actually conducted by the police. In Long, ac-
cording to Professor LaFave, the obvious alternative to the protective search of Long's
vehicle was "moving the suspect away from the vehicle." Id. See also 3 W. LAFAvE, supra
note 34, § 9.4(e) at 532-34. Apart from the situation where there exists an "obvious
alternative," Professor LaFave contends the "least intrusive means" inquiry is otherwise
troublesome: "[T]he question is not whether there will be a certain fourth amendment
intrusion but rather how extensive it will be, and where in addition the consideration of
alternatives is likely to involve numerous imponderables, a 'least intrusive means' in-
quiry has great potential for mischief." LaFave, "Seizures" Typology, supra, at 435.
Though Professor LaFave is correct in noting that in most cases the judicial focus
should be centered on the extensiveness of the particular police intrusion rather than on
whether an intrusion will occur, there are cases, such as Class, in which the Court will
have to consider the necessity for a certain type of fourth amendment intrusion. In Class
there was no disputing that a temporary seizure of Class' vehicle was constitutionally per-
missible. There was, however, serious doubt about the constitutional validity of Officer
McNamee's search of the vehicle's interior. See supra notes 245-59 and accompanying
text. In this instance, a "least intrusive means" inquiry is appropriate to ensure that
police officers do not unnecessarily escalate or extend a permissible intrusion into a
constitutionally impermissible invasion of personal security. See Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500-04 (1983)(plurality opinion)(What began as a consensual inquiry in a pub-
lic place, escalated into an impermissible investigatory detention.).
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fact. Officer McNamee had, at best, a hunch that the car Class was
driving might be stolen. Based on this hunch, and without bother-
ing to check the documents provided by Class, Officer McNamee
intruded, undeniably, into an area that Class reasonably could ex-
pect would remain free from unwarranted police invasion.
There is no merit to the claim that, despite an absence of objec-
tive cause, the intrusion was warranted because the officer merely
sought to obtain "information" 3 14 or that he had a general interest
in combating automobile theft.3 15 Under the constitutional frame-
work constructed by Terry, every police intrusion affecting fourth
amendment interests must be justified by some objective criteria.
31 6
The Court's subsequent cases have not deviated from this rule.
31 7
In the 1983 case of United States v. Place,318 the Court ruled that
a "generalized interest in law enforcement" was sufficient to sup-
port the limited seizure of personal property even though govern-
ment agents lacked both a warrant and probable cause to believe the
property contained contraband or evidence of a crime.3 19 The Place
Court, however, did not leave law enforcement officials unrestrained
in their authority to effectuate detentions of personal items. The
Court stated that official seizures of personal property are constitu-
tionally valid only in situations in which the intruding officers have a
reasonable suspicion that a suspect's property contains contraband
or criminal evidence.
3 20
Similarly, in Brown v. Texas,32 1 a unanimous Court reversed the
conviction of a defendant who had refused to comply with an of-
ficer's demand that he identify himself. The Court declared that "a
seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that so-
ciety's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular indi-
vidual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual
314 People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d at 497, 472 N.E.2d at 1014, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 186 (Jones,
J., dissenting).
315 Brief for Petitioner at 23, n*, New York v. Class 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
316 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
317 See, e.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980)(per curiam)(the fourth amend-
ment's "prohibition of searches and seizures that are not supported by some objective
justification governs all seizures [and searches] of the person") (emphasis added).
318 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
319 Id. at 703-706. But cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976)(fourth amendment permits the stoppng of a vehicle at a fixed border checkpoint
for brief questioning of its occupants even though there is no reason to believe the
particular vehicle contains illegal aliens). For a discussion of Martinez-Fuerte, see Gross-
man, supra note 125, at 145-56.
320 Place, 462 U.S. at 702.
321 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
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officers."'3 22 In Brown, the police officers had neither objective facts
evidencing a necessity for Brown's detention, nor had they acted
pursuant to a neutral plan. Their only reason for stopping Brown
"was to ascertain his identity." 323 That purpose, standing alone,
was not enough to outweigh Brown's fourth amendment guarantee
to be free from unwarranted police intrusions.3 24 Therefore, Of-
ficer McNamee's search in Class cannot escape constitutional scru-
tiny by the facile assertion that the objective of his search was merely
to obtain "information," was done for "purposes of identification"
only,3 25 or helped to promote the state's interest in effective law
enforcement.
Clearly then, the Court did not "apply conventional Fourth
Amendment analysis"3 26 to the facts in Class. The result in this case
cannot be supported under the automobile exception because the
322 Id. at 51.
323 Id. at 52.
324 Id. Cf. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.
221 (1985). In Hayes, the Court held that the fourth amendment did not permit police to
transport a suspect to a police station for fingerprinting without his consent and in the
absence of probable cause or priorjudicial authorization. In dicta, however, the Court
stated that its holding did not imply "that a brief detention in the field for the purpose of
fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable suspicion not amounting to probable
cause, is necessarily impermissible under the Fourth Amendment." 470 U.S. at 816.
Likewise, in Hensley, the Court stated that the police could, where there is reason-
able suspicion warranting a stop, briefly detain a suspect to check his identification, pose
questions, or inform the suspect that another police department wishes to speak with
him. 469 U.S. at 232. Even if the police intrusion in Class could be equated with the
hypothetical "fingerprinting-in-the-field" of Hayes, or detention in Hensley, neither deci-
sion provides any support for the Class result because Officer McNamee had no reason-
able suspicion for his intrusion-an element Hayes and Hensley deemed necessary to
approve the police intrusions discussed in those cases.
325 Cf. United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1970)(en banc)(Godbold, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted), aff'g 413 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1969).
An argument can be constructed that there is a difference where the police
invasion is to seek identification numbers. I.e., because identification numbers, se-
cret and otherwise, are for identification purposes the citizen can have no reason-
able expectation of their remaining private-they are for identification, ergo, the
citizen must expect them to be available to the police for the purpose for which
intended. But the function of being an identification device does not exempt the
device itself, or the instrumentality it identifies, from the fourth amendment. In our
increasingly complex world our motor vehicles are not the only things numbered
for identification. So are such tangible effects as household appliances, lawn
mowers, outboard motors, and even the watches on our wrists. Add to the list such
papers and documents kept in home, safe deposit box or on the person, as bank
checks, drivers' licenses, social security cards, credit cards, insurance policies, secur-
ities, and deeds and mortgages, and the automobile registration papers often car-
ried in the glove compartment of the car. All of these items have primary or
secondary qualities of identification, but this does not subject them, when not in
plain view, to being sought out by police action beyond the reach of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 447.
326 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 969 (Powell, J., concurring).
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police lacked probable cause for the search. Nor can the ruling be
rationalized under a traditional Teny analysis, because the police of-
ficer lacked objective justification for entering Class' vehicle. The
Class ruling exceeds the scope of the Court's precedents in the auto-
mobile exception area and the Terry stop and search cases. Exactly
how far the Court is willing to extend this rationale is left open.
What is clear is that the majority chose to disregard the danger in-
herent in unchecked police discretion. The Court should have
avoided this choice, notwithstanding the cost to law enforcement ef-
ficiency or administrative convenience that the police might have
incurred.
3 27
4. The danger of unfettered discretion
As a result of Class, police officers are not limited in their ability
to conduct a search of a vehicle lawfully stopped. This principle af-
fects not only the work of police, prosecutors and defense attorneys,
but it is significant to everyone concerned with personal security and
liberty. As one noted commentator observed, the protections of the
fourth amendment are important to all persons because they deter-
mine "the kind of society in which we live."3 28 This criticism of the
Class decision cannot be answered with the assertion that the search
for the VIN was akin to an administrative search, because the
Court's administrative search cases do not support this contention.
As Justice White stated in his dissent in Class, the majority's rul-
ing "in effect holds that a search of a car for the VIN is permissible
whenever there is a legal stop, whether or not the driver is even
asked to consent."3 29 As noted above,330 if an officer is permitted to
search for the VIN whenever he lawfully stops a motorist, he is also
free to search for a driver's license, registration certificate or license
plate which may be located somewhere inside the car. In addition,
under the Class Court's reasoning, an officer will not need to possess
any objective facts to justify his intrusion. Clearly, such a result is at
odds with traditional fourth amendment jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he essential purpose of
the prescriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard
327 Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3193-94 (1986)(quoting INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 944 (1983)(" 'fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is
contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objec-
tives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government.' ").
328 E. Griswold, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 39 (1975).
329 106 S. Ct. at 975-76 (White, J., dissenting).
330 See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
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of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government
officials, including law enforcement agents, in order 'to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary inva-
sions.' "331 To give meaning to the fourth amendment's mandate
that police intrusions be "reasonable," the Court has consistently
required, at a minimum,33 2 that an officer have objective facts which
warrant his invasion into an individual's constitutionally protected
privacy concerns.
This basic axiom of fourth amendment doctrine, until the Class
ruling, always has been applicable to police encounters with motor-
ists travelling on the nation's highways. "The word 'automobile' is
not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away
and disappears. ' 33 3 The fourth amendment has always required
some quantum of individualized suspicion with respect to police
searches and seizures of an individual in his home and on the
street.33 4 A similar safeguard is apposite when police confront driv-
ers in their cars.
Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, often necessary mode of trans-
portation to and from one's home, work place, and leisure activities.
Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking
on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and
privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing them-
selves by pedestrian or other modes of travel. Were the individual
subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an
automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would
be seriously circumscribed. As Terry v. Ohio recognized, people are not
shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their
homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests
when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles. 335
By allowing a search for the VIN or some other object which com-
prises part of the state's regulatory scheme of automobiles anytime
the police lawfully stop a vehicle, Class opened the door to abusive
and discriminatory application of this new form of police authority.
The Class Court did not enunciate any limitation upon an officer's
331 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)(citations omitted).
332 Id. at 654.
333 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971)(plurality opinion).
334 Professor Mertens has cogently noted that the requirement of individualized sus-
picion is concerned not only with the need for "identifiable and describable evidence"
by the police, but also with the "weight" of the information possessed by the officer.
"[Tihe police must be able to justify singling out from the rest of humanity (or at least
from the rest of the people in the general area) the particular individual whom they have
stopped [or searched] as somehow meriting this special attention." Mertens, supra note
23, at 594-95.
335 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662-63. See also Gardner, supra note 165, at 16 n.87 (quoting
Yackle, supra note 23, at 410-11).
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decision to inspect the VIN. "Some citizens will be subjected to this
minor indignity while others-perhaps those with more expensive
cars, or different bumper stickers, or different-colored skin-may es-
cape entirely.1
33 6
This criticism of the rationale in Class is not devitalized by the
contention that the search for the VIN "may be likened to [a] type of
warrantless administrative inspection. . . ."337 In response, "[t]he
grave danger of abuse of discretion ... does not disappear simply
because the automobile is subject to state regulation resulting in nu-
merous instances of police-citizen contact." 338 Indiscriminate po-
lice intrusions do not become constitutionally palatable because the
state's intrusion can be conveniently labeled "administrative only."
The fourth amendment applies to searches considered administra-
tive as well as to searches motivated by the possibility of discovering
contraband or evidence of crime.3 39
The Court has granted governmental officials greater latitude
to conduct warrantless administrative inspections in situations in
which the search involves intrusion into an area of privacy less sig-
nificant than the home.340 An inspection scheme, however, cannot
delegate "unbridled discretion... [to] executive and administrative
officers, particularly those in the field, . . . [to choose] when to
search and whom to search." 34 1 In Colonnade Corp. v. United States34
2
and United States v. Biswell,343 the Court upheld the authority of fed-
eral officials to conduct warrantless administrative searches of busi-
nesses subject to a tradition of close supervision and inspection. As
the Court subsequently explained, Colonnade and Biswell made it
clear that warrantless administrative searches are proper "when
Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are
necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory
336 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
337 Brief for Petitioner at 33, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
338 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662.
339 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 312-313 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
340 In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court ruled that administra-
tive searches for housing code violations were constitutional without a showing that the
inspector possesses probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling is in violation of
the law. The probable cause needed for adminstrative inspections could be based upon
the passage of time, nature of the building, or condition of the area. Id. at 538. The
Court, however, ruled that, absent an emergency, a routine administrative inspection
must be authorized by a warrant. Id. at 531.
In Class, of course, not only was there no objective cause to justify the search for the
VIN, there was also no warrant to authorize the search.
341 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 323.
342 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
343 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of
commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will
be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific
purposes."'
3 44
Where a particular regulatory scheme has failed to provide any
standards limiting the scope and frequency of warrantless adminis-
trative inspections, such searches have been invalidated by the
Court. Accordingly, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,345 the Court de-
clared unconstitutional a Congressional statute which conferred
upon federal administrative officials unrestrained authority to con-
duct warrantless health and safety inspections of all businesses en-
gaged in or affecting interstate commerce. The Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, which was challenged in Marshall, not only
brought under its scope businesses which had not been the subject
of a long tradition of federal regulation, 346 it also granted adminis-
trative officials unfettered discretion to conduct searches without
the authorization of a warrant or the guidance of "an administrative
plan containing specific neutral criteria. '34
7
Conversely, in Donovan v. Dewey,348 the Court rejected the argu-
ment that Congress' authorization to the Secretary of Labor to con-
duct warrantless inspections of underground and surface mines
violated the fourth amendment. The Court found that the chal-
lenged inspection program, "in terms of the certainty and regularity
of its application, [provided] a constitutionally adequate substitute
for a warrant."3 49 First, the inspection scheme required the inspec-
tion of all mines and specifically defined the frequency of inspection.
Second, mine operators were specifically notified of the standards
required by the law. These standards included informing the mine
operators of the frequency and purpose of the administrative in-
spections. Finally, the law afforded a judicial forum "for accommo-
dating any special privacy concerns that a specific mine operator
might have."35
0
344 Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600.
345 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
346 Id. at 313.
347 Id. at 323. Cf. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984)(plurality opinion)(the
fourth amendment does not permit an exemption from the warrant requirement for all
administrative investigations into cause and origin of a fire).
348 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
349 Id. at 603.
350 Id. at 604. Donovan distinguished the plan for warrantless searches invalidated in
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. by noting that the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
[OSHA] program in Marshall failed to "tailor the scope and frequency of [OSHA] ad-
ministrative inspections to the particular health and safety concerns posed by the nu-
merous and varied businesses regulated by the statute." Id. at 601. The OSHA
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By applying these principles, a warrantless search to observe a
VIN number, absent objective cause, cannot satisfy constitutional
standards. The decision to search is left to the unchecked discretion
of the officer in the field. The Class Court did not refer to any provi-
sion of New York law that requires police officers to inspect the VIN
whenever they have lawfully stopped a motorist for a traffic viola-
tion. The pertinent statute reads: "Any ... police officer may re-
quest that the operator of any motor vehicle produce for inspection
the certificate of registration for such vehicle and.., shall furnish to
such ... police officer any information necessary for the identifica-
tion of such vehicle and its owner."35' The officer's authority to de-
mand inspection of the VIN is purely discretionary.
Furthermore, the argument that all motorists, in effect, consent
to whatever invasion of privacy that occurs when police officers
search for a VIN during a lawful traffic stop is not persuasive. For
many, automobile travel is a necessity, not a luxury. "An individual
operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable
expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are
subject to government regulation." 35 2 Just because an officer is
granted the authority to demand that a motorist produce for inspec-
tion items in which the motorist has little expectation of privacy
such as a registration certificate or a VIN, the officer, in order to
facilitate his administrative tasks, has not also been granted the au-
thority to invade areas of acknowledged privacy in the automobile
such as the trunk, glove compartment or area underneath the
seat.
35 3
program also did not "provide any standards to guide inspectors either in their selection
of establishments to be searched or in the exercise of their authority to search." Id.
In colytrast to the OSHA plan in Marshall, the program for warrantless searches
upheld in Donovan was specifically tailored to the mining industry and designed to detect
the dangers associated with that industry. Id. at 602-03. Furthermore, while the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 authorized warrantless searches, those searches
were circumscribed by detailed guidelines that inspectors were required to follow. Id. at
603-04. See also Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987).
351 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 401(4) (McKinney 1984).
352 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662. Cf. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973), where the Court rejected the claim that motorists traveling near the interna-
tional border "consent" to searches of their vehicles to discover illegal aliens or contra-
band. The Court in Almeida-Sanchez explained that, unlike the entrepreneurs in
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), and United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), who were aware of the purpose and limits of the warrant-
less searches upheld in those cases, the motorist travelling on the open road is not en-
gaged in any regulated or licensed business, nor does the motorist have any knowledge
of the reasons for or limits of the intrusion to which he is subjected. Almeida-Sanchez, 413
U.S. at 270-72
353 See Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment Issues: Fourth
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The police cannot conduct a search without objective facts that
justify intrusion. The simple claim that the challenged invasion en-
hanced their ability to perform routine functions does not suffice as
ajustification.3 54 Therefore, it is unconvincing to argue, as the state
did in Class, that Officer McNamee's search after his lawful stop of
Class was proper because of both the reduced expectation of privacy
that one has in an automobile and the legitimate governmental and
societal need for enforcement of its important regulatory poli-
cies.3 55 Arguments of lesser expectations of privacy and the perva-
siveness of governmental regulatory schemes miss the point of the
Court's fourth amendment cases in the context of administrative
searches: the discretion of the officer in the field cannot go un-
checked.35 6 To allow the police to decide when to search for the
VIN of a lawfully stopped vehicle is inconsistent with the Court's
disapproval of the unbridled discretion of OSHA inspectors to un-
Amendment Activity, Probable Cause and the Warrant Requirement, 69J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 425 (1978).
[The Court has not proved its claim that expectations of privacy are lower in
automobiles than in most other places. Automobiles are indeed regulated, but the
fact that police may examine license plates, inspection stickers, headlights, exhaust
systems, and other such things hardly proves that one has a reduced expectation of
privacy in items held in the glove compartment, under the seat, or in the trunk.
Similarly, the fact that an automobile travels public thoroughfares hardly proves
that one has a reduced expectation of privacy against governmental prying into con-
cealed areas. [Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)] seems to teach the
very opposite: neither governmental regulation nor an individual's limited disclo-
sures of some aspects of an activity give government a right of warrantless carte
blanche access to all the rest. Expectations of privacy are not so easily diminished.
Id. at 459-60.
354 See Michigan v. Summers 452 U.S. 692, 709 (1981)(Stewart, J., dissenting)(The
fourth amendment places "significant restraints upon police activities, even though the
police and the courts may find those restraints unreasonably inconvenient.").
355 Brief for Petitioner at 32-33, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
356 See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 599, 604-05; Marshall, 436 U.S. at 323; Colonnade, 397 U.S.
at 77; Camara, 387 U.S. 532-33. Cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 782
(197 1)(Harlan, J., dissenting) (The fourth amendment's warrant procedure is applicable
to administrative inspections because such searches involve an invasion of privacy and
the risk of arbitrariness by government officials).
It cannot be seriously argued that the Court's "inventory search" cases-Illinois v.
LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) and South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)-
provide any support for upholding the search of Class' automobile. In Opperman, the
Court held that the police do not violate the fourth amendment when they conduct war-
rantless searches, "using a standard inventory form pursuant to standard police proce-
dures," of automobiles which have been lawfully impounded. 428 U.S. at 366. In
LaFayette, the Court found it was reasonable for police to search the personal effects of a
person lawfully arrested as part of the routine administrative procedure at a police sta-
tion incident to booking and jailing the suspect. 462 U.S. at 648. In both cases the
Court emphasized the standardized nature of the searches. LaFayette, 462 U.S. at 646;
Oppernan, 428 U.S. at 375; id. at 380 n.6 (Powell,J., concurring); id. at 387 n.4 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). In Class there was no standardized rule to guide officers when deciding
whether to search for the VIN.
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dertake random searches in Marshall.
3 57
5. Is there a need for the Class ruling?
The result in Class was not necessary for the effective enforce-
ment of traffic and vehicle safety laws. While it may be true that car
theft has become an uncontrollable epidemic, 358 the Court must not
let the need for more enhanced police authority dilute the protec-
tion afforded all citizens under the fourth amendment.3 59 Prior to
the Class ruling, existing search and seizure doctrine provided the
police with adequate means to deal with criminal conduct involving
moving vehicles. Existing law also furnished the necessary tools for
effective enforcement of traffic and vehicle safety laws. While ensur-
ing that the police are not handcuffed in their efforts to enforce the
law, the Court has recognized that unrestrained police authority to
search an automobile constitutes a serious intrusion upon the pri-
vacy of the motorist.3 60 To safeguard the Constitution's prohibition
against arbitrary invasions by government officials, the Court has re-
quired consistently, up until the Class decision, that the police pos-
sess some objective justification or follow neutral criteria361 before
357 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 323. See supra notes 345-57 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Marshall.
358 Brief for Petitioner at 23 n.*, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
359 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274 (1973); cf. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)(plurality opinion).
360 See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975). The Ortiz Court stated that
unlimited "discretion to search private automobiles is not consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. To
protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable
cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search." Id.
361 The Nebraska Supreme Court, in State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 383 N.W.2d 461
(1986), ruled that the use of neutral criteria is not enough to uphold a police detention
where establishment and application of that criteria is left to the unfettered discretion of
the officer in the field. In Crom, several patrolmen and a sergeant of the Omaha Police
Department decided to set up a "transitory checkpoint." The officers were to check
every fourth vehicle reaching the checkpoint on the pretext of checking the motorist's
driver's license and registration. In fact, the actual purpose was to discover whether the
driver emitted an odor of alcohol. The decision to set up the checkpoint had been made
on the spot by the officers in the field; they "were not acting under any standard, guide-
lines, or procedures promulgated by policymakers for the police department or other
law enforcement agency." 222 Neb. at -, 383 N.W.2d at 462. Crom's vehicle was one
of the fourth cars to reach the checkpoint. Prior to his arrival, there was no indication
that he was driving under the influence of alcohol, or that he had otherwise committed a
crime or traffic violation. At the stop, the odor of alcohol was detected on Crom's
breath. He was given a field sobriety test which he failed. He was later charged and
convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol. 222 Neb. at-, 383 N.W.2d at
462.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed Crom's conviction, ruling that Crom had
been unreasonably seized in violation of the fourth amendment. The court stated that
the checkpoint was "subject to the constitutional infirmity found to exist in both Dela-
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detaining or searching vehicles traveling in the interior of the na-
tion's roads.
As a general rule, where law enforcement officials have prob-
able cause to believe that the driver of a particular automobile is
involved in or associated with criminal conduct or has committed a
traffic infraction, they may stop the vehicle and, depending on local
custom, arrest the driver3 62 or issue the driver a citation. In addi-
tion, where the police have probable cause to believe that a certain
car is carrying contraband or evidence of crime, they may search
that vehicle without first obtaining a warrant.3 63 Moreover, even
when the police do not possess probable cause for linking a motorist
with criminal activities, the police may stop and detain a motorist for
investigative purposes if they have a reasonable suspicion that a mo-
torist is involved in criminal conduct.36 4
In the ordinary traffic stop situation, the police enjoy substan-
tial flexibility in ensuring the safety of others and themselves while
conducting their investigations and law enforcement functions. The
Court has upheld the police practice of ordering motorists out of
their cars even in the context of a routine traffic stop because of
"the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a per-
son seated in an automobile."3 65 In addition, where an officer in-
ware [v. Prouse] and Brown [v. Texas]; that is, a driver's reasonable expectation of privacy
was rendered subject to arbitrary invasion solely at the discretion of officers in the field."
222 Neb. at -, 383 N.W.2d at 463.
362 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). After arresting the driver, the po-
lice may also conduct a search of the passenger compartment of the automobile, includ-
ing any closed container found there. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The
Court has not directly ruled whether a custodial arrest of a motorist for violating a minor
traffic offense is constitutional under the fourth amendment. See Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)("It seems to me that a persuasive
claim might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest of the petitioner for a
minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
363 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982).
364 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). In United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221 (1985), the Court ruled that the police could stop and detain a person whom
they reasonably believed was involved in or was wanted in connection with a completed
felony. Balancing the competing interests at stake, the Court concluded that the police
need not always have probable cause to arrest before detaining a suspect wanted in
connection with a past crime. Id. at 229. The Court found the "strong government
interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice" outweighed the individuas
interest "to be free of a stop and detention that is no more extensive than permissible in
the investigation of imminent or ongoing crimes." Id. The Hensley Court also held that
an officer may stop and detain a suspect in reliance on a police bulletin of another police
department provided that the bulletin has been issued on "the basis of articulable facts
supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense."
Id. at 232.
365 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110.
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vestigating a routine traffic stop has reasonable grounds for
believing a motorist represents a potential threat to the officer's
safety, a protective search of the vehicle for weapons is constitution-
ally permissible.366 Given these powers, it cannot be said that the
police are handicapped by constitutional "technicalities" in their ef-
forts to apprehend those who violate the law. Furthermore, law en-
forcement officials are not required "to take unnecessary risks in the
performance of their duties."3 6
7
Notwithstanding the substantial flexibility afforded police in
conducting their investigations, the Court has remained sensitive to
the seriousness which accompanies any police intrusion upon a mo-
torist on the open road. Detaining vehicles randomly is an intolera-
ble restraint on the motorist's right to "free passage without
interruption. '" 3 68 Arbitrary searches of automobiles constitute a
substantial invasion of drivers' reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Class decision, however, discards these constitutional safe-
guards and enhances police power to an unprecedented degree
without adequate explanation. The state's interest in effective en-
forcement of its traffic laws does not compel this unparalleled
amount of police authority. Class was stopped for the commission
of two traffic violations, speeding and driving with a broken wind-
shield. The officers had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause
to believe he or his vehicle had been involved in criminal activities.
Officer McNamee's only reason for checking the VIN was based on
an unsubstantiated hunch that the vehicle might be stolen. Thus,
the sole basis for the police search was Class' commission of two
ordinary traffic violations.
The Court has previously acknowledged that "[t]he foremost
method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations .... is act-
ing upon observed violations."3 69 During such stops, an officer is
permitted to inspect a VIN in plain view or to scrutinize other forms
of identification. While a valid stop gives the officer an opportunity
to observe the VIN or other items subject to governmental regula-
tion, such a stop does not supply an objective reason to search a
vehicle and invade a motorist's legitimate expectation of privacy. 370
Officer McNamee lacked an objective reason to search Class' vehi-
cle. His conduct was an arbitrary invasion and, thus, struck at the
366 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
367 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110.
368 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
369 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659.
370 Class, 106 S. Ct. at 972 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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core of the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable
police intrusions.
C. THE CLASS RULING IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE BURGER COURT'S
HOSTILITY TOWARD ESTABLISHED FOURTH AMENDMENT
DOCTRINE
The Class decision is further evidence of the Court's willingness
to undermine fourth amendment freedoms in the name of efficient
law enforcement. Over the last several years, the Court's efforts to
scale-down the scope of the fourth amendment's substantive protec-
tion has been most evident in cases involving investigative deten-
tions and searches. Beginning with Summers,371 continuing with
Royer 372 and Place,373 and finally ending with Sharpe,3 74 the Court has
established a new test for assessing police intrusions which do not
amount to full-blown searches or arrests. That test, which may be
called the "diligence and necessary" test, was fully formulated in
Sharpe. The Sharpe Court was asked to decide whether a twenty-
minute detention was too long to qualify as an investigative stop.
This new test, however, has not been limited to the particular issue
raised in Sharpe. Indeed, Justice O'Connor relied indirectly on the
test in Class.3 75
As described by Chief Justice Burger in Sharpe, the new stan-
dard for judging the constitutionality of investigative searches or
seizures reads as follows: "Whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their sus-
picions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain [or
search] the defendant. '3 76 This standard is problematic for several
reasons. First, the "diligence and necessary" test has permitted the
Court to overlook the lack of objective facts possessed by police to
justify their intrusions. Second, the test is a convenient judicial tool
for handling troublesome police intrusions; it can be used whenever
a police invasion stops short of a full-scale search or seizure. Third,
the test offers no guidance to the officer in the field. Fourth, at the
point of application by a judge, the test is a constitutional illusion.
It provides no framework for decision; therefore, the judge is in-
vited to wink at dubious police behavior in the name of efficient law
371 452 U.S. at 701 n.14.
372 460 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion).
373 462 U.S. at 709.
374 470 U.S. at 686.
375 See supra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
376 Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686.
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enforcement. Finally, the test misplaces the Court's focus when de-
ciding fourth amendment cases.
First, by focusing on whether the police have acted diligently
and taken steps necessary to effectuate the purpose of their intru-
sion upon a suspect, the Court ignores the principal strength of the
Terry holding that even a minor intrusion "must be based on a fixed,
objective level of suspicion, and cannot be justified merely on the
basis of its utility to law enforcement in a particular case." 3 7 7 Under
its new test, the Court has often "manufactured" a reasonable suspi-
cion in order to satisfy the central requirement of Terry.378
Second, the Court's new "diligence and necessary" test is too
malleable. Courts can utilize it whenever police intrusions are
claimed to implicate fourth amendment interests. Terry, however,
did not intend to convert the protections of the fourth amendment
into a general test that all police intrusions falling short of a full-
scale search or arrest need only be "reasonable."3 79 Terry dealt with
377 Wasserstrom, supra note 23, at 350; see also Mertens, supra note 23, at 594-95
("[T]he police must be able to justify singling out from the rest of humanity (or at least
from the rest of the people in the general area) the particular individual whom they have
stopped as somehow meriting this special attention."). See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 91-92 (1979)(The police must have a reasonable belief or suspicion that a person is
carrying a weapon before they may frisk him.).
378 For example, in Summers, the Court explained that the existence of a valid search
warrant for contraband provided the objective justification for detaining an occupant of
the premises to be searched. 452 U.S. at 703. But the search warrant in Summers did not
authorize the seizure of Summers or anyone else. A reasonable suspicion for detaining
Summers was established only by the Court's inference that because there was probable
cause to search the premises for contraband, there was also a reasonable basis for sus-
pecting that an occupant of the premises was likewise engaged in criminal activity. The
Court left open whether a similar result would be justified if the search warrant merely
authorized a search for evidence. Id. at 705 n.20.
For a discussion as to what the Summers Court meant by "occupants" of the prem-
ises, see Kamisar, The Steagald and Summers Cases: What is the Scope of the Authority Carried
by Arrests and Search Warrants, in THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 165, at 130-132; see also 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 4.9(e) at 309-10.
In Sharpe, the Court's basis for upholding the assumption of the court of appeals
that there was reasonable suspicion to support a stop of Savage's pickup truck was
highly questionable. 470 U.S. at 700-02 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 710 n.9 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Moreover, as Justice Marshall noted in his concurrence, discussion
of the issue was unnecessary; the Court could have simply assumed the existence of
reasonable suspicion as had been done earlier in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
699 n.1 (1983). Instead, the Court found a "clear justification" for the stop, 470 U.S. at
693 n.3, despite the fact that the government had not presented the issue of whether
there was reasonable suspicion for the stop in its certiorari petition and "not a single
word [was] devoted to it in the briefs." Id. at 700 (Marshall, J., concurring). In Class,
there was no reasonable suspicion whatsoever which could have justified Officer Mc-
Namee's intrusion into Class' vehicle. 106 S. Ct. at 963.
379 See Place, 462 U.S. at 721 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Summers, 452 U.S. at
706 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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a specialized area of police conduct which did not lend itself to the
traditional requirements of the warrant procedure and probable
cause standard. This unique conduct involved the "necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer
on the beat."3 8 0
The Burger Court has applied its new test to situations and en-
vironments not envisioned by the Court in Teny. This new standard
applies to the officer on the beat reacting swiftly to his observations,
to the officer making a planned, warrant-supported search of a pri-
vate home,38 1 to state and federal drug enforcement agents operat-
ing in the relative security of the nation's airports,38 2 to law
enforcement officials patrolling the nation's interstate highways, 383
to customs officials stationed at the international border,3 84 to
school officials in the nation's public schools, 38 5 and, now, to police
officers conducting routine stops for traffic violations. Arguably,
any police intrusion falling short of a full scale search or arrest can
be defended as a valid Terry-investigation in spite of an obvious lack
of similarity to the type of police-citizen encounter involved in the
Terry facts.
The third problem with the Burger Court's standard is that it
provides no guidance to the officer in the field in relation to the
outer boundaries of a permissible Terry stop or search. As Professor
LaFave has noted, the Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence "is
primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activi-
ties and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applica-
ble by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in
which they are necessarily engaged."3 86 The Court's articulation
and application of the "diligence and necessary" standard simply
says to the police: "Do whatever it takes to complete your investiga-
tion, just make sure that it is done quickly."
United States v. Sharpe387 illustrates this point. The Sharpe Court
held that an individual reasonably suspected of criminal conduct
may be detained for twenty minutes when the detention is necessary
to conduct an investigation of suspected criminal activity. Drug En-
380 Teny, 392 U.S. at 20.
381 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
382 Place, 462 U.S. at 709; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)(plurality
opinion).
383 Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687.
384 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3312 (1985); see United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873-82 (1975).
385 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
386 LaFave, supra note 99, at 141. See also LaFave, supra note 143, at 52 n.63.
387 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
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forcement Agent (DEA) Cooke, patrolling in an unmarked vehicle,
observed a pickup truck traveling with a Pontiac on a South Carolina
highway. Cooke's suspicions were aroused because the truck ap-
peared to be "heavily loaded"; he radioed the South Carolina State
Highway Patrol for assistance in making an investigative stop.3
8 8
Officer Thrasher of the State Patrol responded in a marked patrol
vehicle to Cooke's call. After the officers decided to stop the two
suspected vehicles, 8 9 Thrasher signaled the Pontiac, the lead vehi-
cle, to pull over. As Thrasher did so, the driver of the pickup truck
"cut between"390 the patrol car and the Pontiac, and continued
down the highway. Cooke then stopped the Pontiac, while Thrasher
chased after the pickup truck.
3 91
Cooke secured identification from the driver of the Pontiac,
who was defendant Sharpe. Unable to reach Officer Thrasher,
Cooke then radioed the local police and requested two officers to
"maintain the situation,"3 92 while Cooke left to find Thrasher. In
the interim, Thrasher had stopped the pickup truck and secured
identification from its driver, defendant Savage. Thrasher con-
ducted his own investigation of the situation, but apparently found
no cause to arrest Savage. Despite Savage's protests, Thrasher pro-
hibited Savage from leaving until Cooke arrived. Approximately fif-
teen minutes later, Cooke arrived on the scene and conducted his
own investigation. Upon detecting the odor of marijuana and with-
out Savage's permission, Cooke opened the truck and found a large
number of burlap-wrapped bales resembling bales of marijuana.
Savage was then arrested. Cooke later returned to the Pontiac and
arrested Sharpe.
Approximately thirty to forty minutes had elasped between the
stop of the Pontiac and the arrest of Sharpe.393 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the length of the detentions of both Savage and
Sharpe exceeded the limits of a valid Terry stop.3 9 4 Before the
Supreme Court, the only issue considered was whether it was rea-
sonable to detain Savage, the driver of the pickup truck, for approxi-
mately twenty minutes.3 95
388 Id. at 677.
389 There was reason to believe the officers decided to stop the vehicles not because
they possessed a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, but because Agent Cooke
was about to run out of gas. Id. at 710-11 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
390 Id. at 678.
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id. at 679.
394 712 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
395 The Court explained that the length of Sharpe's detention was not in issue be-
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Avoiding the creation of firm rules to guide police officers on
the permissible duration of Terry stops, the Sharpe Court declared
that "our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops. [In-
stead] ... we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforce-
ment purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time
reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes."3 96 The Court was
correct when it stated that its cases have imposed "no rigid time
limitation on Terry stops." In fact, the Court has imposed very few
limitations on police conduct in executing Terry investigations.
Indeed, in its efforts to offer the police maximum flexibility in
effectuating their investigations, the Court has given police a virtual
"green light" to detain persons and their possessions until probable
cause is established for an arrest. In Sharpe, the Court was unwilling
to hold that a twenty-minute detention was per se too long. While
conceding that an investigative stop cannot continue indefinitely,
the Sharpe Court argued that a bright line rule would undermine po-
lice effectiveness and was unnecessary because "common sense and
ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria."
3 97
This statement, unfortunately, means little, if anything, to the officer
in the field who must decide how long he may detain a suspect
before exceeding the limits of a valid Terry stop. Furthermore, such
a standard does not inform the officer when he may conduct a
search of a suspect's possessions or his vehicle.
On the contrary, the application of the Sharpe criteria to every-
day police activities encourages ad hoc determinations by individual
police officers. If "common sense and ordinary human experience"
are to provide the guideposts for the officer in the field, then virtu-
ally any conduct which the average officer considers necessary to his
investigation would be permissible; presumably, most police officers
exercise "common sense" and are trained not to exceed the bounds
of "ordinary human experience" in their investigative functions.
Thus, the Court's new standard is unsatisfactory because it fails to
establish any guidelines to govern the conduct and discretion of the
police when they administer Terry stops and searches.
The fourth problem presented by the "diligence and neces-
cause his detention was not pertinent to Cooke's discovery of the marijuana in Savage's
pickup truck. "The marihuana was in Savage's pickup, not in Sharpe's Pontiac; the con-
traband introduced at [their] trial cannot logically be considered the 'fruit' of Sharpe's
detention." 470 U.S. at 683.
396 Id. at 685.
397 Id. See also, United States v. Montoya de Herandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3312
(1985)(quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685)("[W]e have consistently rejected hard-and-fast
time limits.... Instead, 'common sense and ordinary human experience must govern
over rigid criteria.' ").
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sary" standard announced in Sharpe is closely related to its third
flaw. The test provides no guidance to the officer in the field and
similarly fails to provide any framework to the judges who must ulti-
mately determine the legality of police searches and seizures.
Judges in the lower courts can easily manipulate the application of
the test in efforts to uphold official intrusions which exceed the lim-
its of a valid Teny investigation. 398 This criticism is not intended to
disparage judges all of whom are sworn to uphold the Constitu-
tion. 399 Instead, it simply recognizes that judges are affected by so-
cietal pressures to uphold convictions, especially in cases where
overwhelming and illegally obtained evidence is linked to the
defendant.
400
This pressure has become particularly acute where convictions
have been secured against individuals trafficking illegal drugs.4 0
1
398 State v. Byrd, 23 N.C. App. 718, 209 S.E.2d 516 (1974), illustrates this point. A
NewJersey state trooper observed Byrd operating a vehicle on the NewJersey Turnpike
and, without any probable cause or suspicion of crime or a traffic violation, decided to
make a random check of Byrd's license and registration. After Byrd produced a license
but failed to produce a registration certificate, the officer searched the glove compart-
ment. The officer found a pistol in the glove compartment and immediately arrested
Byrd. A subsequent inventory search of the car disclosed jewelry implicating Byrd in an
armed robbery in North Carolina. 23 N.C. App. at 719-20, 209 S.E.2d at 517.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the search of Byrd's vehicle was not
contrary to the fourth amendment. "When defendant could not produce a registration
certificate, the examination of the glove compartment for evidence of registration and
ownership was reasonable, and the officer could not ignore the pistol that he found."
Id., 209 S.E.2d at 517.
399 Cf. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash- Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against
the Danger of Convicting The Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. Rav. 717, 780 (1974)(there is compel-
ling pressure on trial and appellate courts to sustain convictions, especially in "ugly
cases," notwithstanding constitutional errors in eyewitness identification procedures).
400 Cf Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977)(Stevens, J., concurring)(in
judging the "admissibility of particular identification testimony it is sometimes difficult
to put other evidence of guilt entirely to one side.").
401 See generally N.Y. Times, August 10, 1986 at Al. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
513-519 (1983)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)(Society's compelling interest in "overcoming
the extraordinary obstacles to the detection of drug traffickers" justifies police intru-
sions designed to detect illegal drug smuggling.). Interestingly, over the last several
years drug-related cases have dominated the Court's search and seizure docket, and
have provided the vehicles for some of the Court's most important fourth amendment
rulings. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985);
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692
(1981); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
For other recent drug-related cases resolving important fourth amendment issues,
see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)(the warrantless search of a motor home is
constitutional provided there is probable cause for the search); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) (school officials need not obtain a warrant to search students subject
to their authority, nor are they required to possess probable cause to justify warrantless
searches of students; a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing is sufficient); Segura v.
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"Get tough" policies sound good on the evening news and provide
good political hay for constituents oppressed by drug-related crime
and violence, but the application of such measures will affect the
fourth amendment interests of the law-abiding as well as the law-
breaker.40 2 Indeed, it is conceivable that when Officer McNamee
"poked his head" inside Class' vehicle to look for the VIN, he took
advantage of the situation to check for the existence of illegal drugs
in locations that were not visible from outside the vehicle. Judicial
standards that provide no checks against such police intrusions will
not only fail to provide adequate guidelines for the officer in the
field, but will also fail to protect innocent persons from police
overreaching.
The Court's new test also invites judges to construct post hoc
rationalizations for police conduct that ordinarily would not pass
constitutional muster. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Sharpe,
demonstrated that the government had not established that it was
objectively infeasible to investigate the suspects in a more efficient
United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing between possessory
and privacy interests in the context of a warrantless entry to secure a private residence);
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)(police monitoring of a beeper signal that
reveals information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance is
subject to fourth amendment restrictions); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109
(1984)(the additional invasion of an individual's privacy by a government agent must be
tested by the degree to which the government intrusion exceeded the scope of the pri-
vate intrusion); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983)(plurality opinion)(the seizure of
property in plain view is permissible provided, inter alia, there is probable cause to asso-
ciate the property with criminal activity); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983) (police monitoring of a beeper signal, emitting from a defendant's car while trav-
eling on public roads, did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy of the defend-
ant); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)(automobile exception permits
warrantless search of sealed containers found inside a lawfully stopped vehicle); Wash-
ington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982)(police officer may accompany an arrested person
into his residence and seize contraband in plain view); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981) (custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile permits a search of the passen-
ger compartment of the automobile). See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)(de-
termination of whether probable cause exists to support the issuance of a search warrant
should be judged by the totality of the circumstances). The Court's eagerly awaited
ruling on the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule came in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), another drug-related case.
402 See generally Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986)(a police officer is liable for
damages arising from an arrest that was not "objectively reasonable," even though the
officer had obtained an arrest warrant from ajudicial officer finding that probable cause
exists for the arrest). In Malley, the good-faith police allegations supporting issuance of
the arrest warrant were based on dubious references, overheard in a court-ordered wire-
tap, that linked the defendant Briggs to a marijuana party. The Briggs were a prominent
couple from Narragansett, Rhode Island. Mr. Briggs was a real estate developer and
bank director with no criminal record who had actively participated in civic and charita-
ble affairs. See N.Y. Times, March 6, 1986, at A20.
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manner.40 3 The government failed to show why two trained of-
ficers, driving in separate vehicles each equipped with flashing
lights, could not have completed simulataneously, or nearly so, the
stop of the Pontiac and pickup truck. The government also failed to
explain why Agent Cooke did not follow the pickup truck since it
was the primary focus of his suspicions. In addition, the govern-
ment did not offer an adequate explanation as to why Officer
Thrasher, who was aware of the reasons for Agent Cooke's suspi-
cions and was an officer trained in basic narcotic detection, was inca-
pable of executing the investigation of Savage's pickup truck.
404
Finally, the Sharpe majority failed to consider why it was necessary
for Agent Cooke to enlist the services of a state patrolman and two
local officers. Other DEA agents should have been available to as-
sist Agent Cooke. As noted by Justice Brennan, Agent Cooke was
unable to reach his DEA backups apparently because the other
agents were "sleeping or eating breakfast rather than monitoring
their radios for calls."
40 5
Rather than hold the government accountable for these blun-
ders in investigative procedures, Chief Justice Burger simply re-
sponded that courts "should not indulge in unrealistic second-
guessing" 406 of police activities. Requiring law enforcement offi-
cials to effectuate their investigative methods in a manner which is
least intrusive upon an individual's fourth amendment interests is
not, however, unrealistic judicial second-guessing. The fourth
amendment is no "technicality. ' 40 7 The rights it guarantees "are
not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispen-
sable freedoms." 408 The amendment is a constitutional bulwark
designed to protect all citizens, the law-abiding as well as the crimi-
nal, from arbitrary and unreasonable police intrusions.
The inevitable result of the Constitution's prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures and its requirement that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause is that police officers who obey its
strictures will catch fewer criminals. That is not a political outcome
impressed upon an unwilling citizenry by unelected judges. It is the
price the framers anticipated and were willing to pay to ensure the
sanctity of the person, the home, and property against unrestrained
governmental power.409
403 470 U.S. at 712 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
404 Id. at 712-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Dix, supra note 187, at 891.
405 470 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
406 Id. at 686.
407 See Stewart, supra note 301, at 1393.
408 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949)(Jackson, J., dissenting).
409 Stewart, supra note 301, at 1392-93. As Professor Amsterdam has reminded us,
the Court's enforcement of fourth amendment restrictions "is quintessentially a regula-
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The Court in Terry did not depart from this principle, and the
rationale of the Terry Court should not be utilized as a tool to en-
hance police authority in the name of "more effective law enforce-
ment." It does not suffice to suggest that the police must be allowed
to "graduate their responses to the demands of any particular situa-
tion. ' 410 The fourth amendment was proposed and ratified in order
to limit the investigative powers of law enforcement officials; it was
not intended to be a judicial device for "balancing away" constitu-
tional safeguards. While it is true that police officers should be pro-
vided sufficient flexibility to deal with the serious encounters they
face daily, they must not be granted an open-ended license to
"graduate" their responses because of careless policework or to ig-
nore readily available and less intrusive investigative alternatives.
As Justice Brennan aptly noted in Sharpe: "Terry's exception to the
probable-cause safeguard must not be expanded to the point where
the constitutionality of a citizen's detention turns only on whether
the individual officers were coping as best they could given inade-
quate training, marginal resources, negligent supervision or
botched communications.
' 4 11
The final problem with the Court's "diligence and necessary"
test is that it focuses on the wrong issue. The central question
under the fourth amendment should be whether the challenged in-
trusion is unduly intrusive. 4 12 By focusing on the diligence of the
police, the Court's formulation of fourth amendment principles
takes its shape from the perspective of the police officer rather than
from the perspective of the individual who is the subject of a partic-
ular police intrusion. Although the Court's fourth amendment ju-
risprudence helps provide the police with workable guideposts for
their everyday activities,4 13 the amendment's ultimate purpose is to
protect the personal security and privacy of the individual. 414 Thus,
when the Court resolves fourth amendment questions it must keep
in mind that the explicit function of the amendment is to guarantee
tion of the police." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
349, 371 (1974).
410 Place, 462 U.S. at 709 n.10.
411 Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 719 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
412 See id. at 690 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)("Even a stop that lasts no
longer than necessary to complete the investigation for which the stop was made may
amount to an illegal arrest if the stop is more than 'minimally intrusive.' The stop must
first be found not unduly intrusive before any balancing of the government's interest
against the individual's becomes appropriate."); Place, 462 U.S. 722 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in judgment).
413 LaFave, supra note 99, at 141.
414 See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FoURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNrrED STATES CONSTrrTTION 103 (1937).
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"[t]he right of the people to be secure in person, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures... "415 The
Court's "diligence and necessary" test poorly serves the fourth
amendment's expressed intention. Whether the police have acted
diligently often has little to do with whether an individual's fourth
amendment interests have been violated. As Justice Blackmun has
noted in the context of airport stops, "[ilt makes little difference to a
traveller whose luggage is seized whether the police conscientiously
followed a lead or bungled the investigation. The duration and in-
trusiveness of the seizure is not altered by the diligence the police
exercise."
416
The Court's current approach to investigative search and
seizure questions is both formless and unrestrained. It is formless
because the current standard provides no guidance to lower courts
and officers operating in the field. It is unrestrained because the
traditional methods for circumscribing investigative intrusions no
longer are effective. Under Terry, a police intrusion had to be "rea-
sonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the in-
terference in the first place."'4 17  If, however, the asserted
governmental interest that justifies an intrusion is merely a genera-
lized interest in law enforcement, the requirement that the intrusion
be reasonably related to its justification provides no limitation for
confining the intrusion.4 18 For instance, as applied to a detention
for purposes of facilitating a search of a home,
the requirement that the scope of the intrusion be reasonably related
to its justifications does not provide a limiting principle for circum-
scribing the detention. If the purpose of the detention is to help the
police make the search, the detention can be as long as the police find
it necessary to protract the search.
4 19
Likewise, the detentions in Sharpe and United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez420 were constitutionally "reasonable" because they were
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
their initiation, namely, a generalized interest in law enforcement.
Both detentions, according to the Court, were necessary to confirm
police suspicions of criminal conduct and, thus, were constitutional
despite their protracted length. In other words, so long as the po-
415 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
416 Place, 462 U.S. at 722 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
417 Teny, 392 U.S. at 20.
418 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 712 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
419 Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
420 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985). In de Hernandez, the Court upheld a 24-hour detention of a
suspected alimentary canal smuggler at the international border. For a strong criticism
of de Hernandez, see 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 10.5(b) at 718.
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lice action promoted in a reasonable manner the government's in-
terest in effective law enforcement, that action was constitutionally
permissible. As currently stated, however, the Court's test is inap-
propriately balanced in favor of police interests. Rather than con-
struct fourth amendment principles with an eye toward the
enchancement of law enforcement practices, the Court should fash-
ion fourth amendment rules that protect personal security and
privacy.
In short, the Burger Court's standard for assessing the constitu-
tionality of Terry-type searches and seizures is an unsatisfactory test
that provides no guidance to the police and lower courts, and does
little to protect fourth amendment liberties. The Class decision is
another example of the Court's inadequate efforts in this area.
The Class majority declared that the police search was "focused
in its objective and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that
objective." 421 The Court also noted that the officer "did not root
about the interior of [Class'] automobile before proceeding to ex-
amine the VIN. '422 These statements, while unobjectionable in
their description of Officer McNamee's search, do not articulate the
objective fact or reason which justified Officer McNamee's search.
The Class Court's reasoning was unconvincing in this critical aspect:
not one of the factors catalogued by the Court to support Officer
McNamee's intrusion-the lack of a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the VIN itself, the observation of Class committing two mi-
nor traffic violations, the government's interest both in promoting
road safety and shielding officers from danger, and the unintrusive
nature of the search-provide, either jointly or severally, a persua-
sive reason to uphold his search for the VIN.423
Closer scrutiny reveals that the majority simply combined these
factors on one side of a tenuous balancing equation to justify the
conclusion that the competing interests at stake weigh in favor of
upholding the police invasion. As Justice Brennan noted on a prior
occasion, this type of balancing process is one "in which the judicial
thumb apparently [was] planted firmly on the law-enforcement side
of the scales."'424
The Class ruling also demonstrates, albeit sub silentio, the Court's
dissatisfaction with the "least restrictive means" test.425 Justice
O'Connor does not discuss the issue, despite the existence of rea-
421 Cass, 106 S. Ct. at 968.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 975 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
424 Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 720 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
425 See supra, note 313.
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sonable alternatives to Officer McNamee's unchecked intrusion.426
The officers, for example, could have conducted a radio check on
the vehicle's license plate or registration certificate.427 Officer Mc-
Namee also could have sought Class' consent to enter the vehicle
and move the papers. Moreover, Officer McNamee could have de-
manded access to the VIN pursuant to § 401 of New York's Vehicle
and Traffic Law.4
28
Finally, the Court's holding proffers no adequate test for judg-
ing the constitutionality of future police behavior analogous to Of-
ficer McNamee's search. Instead, officers in the field must decide
for themselves when entry into a vehicle to inspect a VIN that is not
visible from the outside is constitutionally permissible.
The Court's pre-Class doctrine which required that police have
probable cause or reasonable suspicion before intruding into the
private areas of stopped vehicles is preferable to the new test articu-
lated in Sharpe and applied in Class. The standards are "probable
cause" and "reasonable suspicion," and were articulated in Carroll v.
United States429 and Michigan v. Long. They both are workable rules
426 See Brief for Respondent at 28, New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986), where
Class argued that "the record here does not establish that law enforcement officers lack
less intrusive methods to combat the problem of car theft which the State emphasizes."
427 Even after discovering the gun, Class' status as an unlicensed driver, and the fact
that Class did not own the vehicle he was driving, the officers still did not conduct a
radio check on the vehicle Class was operating. This omission was not explained in the
state's briefs in the lower courts or in the Supreme Court.
428 See supra note 58 and accompanying text for the language of § 401. Of course,
this option is troublesome because it potentially could have "placed the officers in the
same situation that the holding in Mimms allows officers to avoid-permitting an individ-
ual being detained to have possible access to a dangerous weapon and the benefit of the
partial concealment provided by the car's exterior." Class, 106 S. Ct. at 967.
On the other hand, if the Court's reasoning is applied literally, then police officers
will have unrestrained authority to search glove compartments, pocketbooks, briefcases
and other areas of recognized privacy if a motorist fails to bring every item of documen-
tation with him after exiting his vehicle during a police stop. A constitutionally more
attractive alternative to this proposition is that nonconsensual police intrusions to se-
cure documentation are valid only when necessitated by some reasonable suspicion that
justifies the search. Thus, where a motorist emerges from his car without his driver's
license or registration certificate, a nonconsensual search of the interior of the vehicle
would not be permitted unless the officer possessed some objective justification for the
search-for example, a reasonable suspicion that the car was stolen or contained contra-
band.
Of course, where a motorist refuses consent to a police request for a document
search, he subjects himself to sanction in the form of a summons or possibly even arrest
for not producing the document. The officer has no right to search the protected area
absent objective justification; but the motorist does have an obligation to produce re-
quested documents when legitimately stopped by the police. Except in extraordinary
cases, it is likely that most motorists, confronted with this choice, will consent to a lim-
ited search for the documents.
429 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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that are not only easily applied by courts reviewing police intru-
sions, but are also familiar to the officer on the beat.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To many, the result in Class will not seem objectionable. After
all, Officer McNamee's intrusion into Class' vehicle was hardly the
type of police invasion that disturbs most people. He simply en-
tered the vehicle to ascertain the VIN. And, while it was true that
Officer McNamee had no objective reason to justify this intrusion,
his invasion was considerably more temperate than other infamous
police searches that have incurred the wrath of the Supreme
Court.43 0 To those who view Class in so mild a light, the words of
430 Probably the most abominable search to be reviewed by the Court in the twentieth
century occurred in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). There, three deputy
sheriffs illegally entered Rochin's home and forced open the door to his bedroom. They
found Rochin partly dressed sitting on the bed on which his wife was lying. After the
deputies observed two capsules, Rochin put them in his mouth. A struggle ensued dur-
ing which the three deputies jumped upon Rochin in an attempt to extract the capsules.
Id. at 166.
Unable to retrieve the capsules in this manner, the deputies handcuffed Rochin and
brought him to a hospital. There, a doctor, at the direction of one of the deputies and
against the will of Rochin, administered an emetic solution through a tube into Rochin's
stomach. The solution induced vomiting, and in the vomited matter the deputies dis-
covered two capsules which later proved to contain morphine. Id.
Speaking for the Court,Justice Frankfurter stated that this conduct "shocks the con-
science" and was "bound to offend even hardened sensibilities." Id. at 172. In Frank-
furter's view, these police methods were "too close to the rack and the screw to permit
constitutional differentiation" and, thus, they violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id.
Another well-known search case was Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Although
Mapp is best known for its holding that the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment-
which prohibits in a criminal prosecution the admission of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment-is applicable to the states pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment, the police search in that case was also detestable. The breadth of Mapp's
holding on the exclusionary rule was significantly limited in United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984). In Leon the Court modified the exclusionary rule to permit the use of
evidence obtained by the police "acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant"
issued by a magistrate but later found to be unsupported by probable cause. Id. at 913.
Without a warrant or exigent conditions, several police officers broke into the home
of Dollree Mapp looking for a suspect wanted in a recent bombing and some "policy
paraphernalia." When Mapp demanded to see a search warrant, a piece of paper was
displayed by an officer. Mapp then grabbed the paper and placed it in her bosom. A
struggle occurred in which the officers retrieved the paper and roughly treated Mapp.
The officers then conducted a top-to-bottom search of Mapp's home. Mapp, 367 U.S. at
644-45.
Although no suspect or "policy paraphernalia" were found, the police did find four
books-Affairs of a Troubadour, Little Darlings, London Stage Affairs, and Memories of a Hotel
Man-and one hand-drawn obscene picture. See Stewart, supra note 301, at 1367. Even-
tually, Mapp was charged with possession of lewd and lascivious books and pictures.
367 U.S. at 643 n.1.
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Justice Bradley, spoken over a century ago, provide an appropriate
counterpoise:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repul-
sive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations
from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adher-
ing to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of persons
and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal con-
struction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual de-
preciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Their motto should be obsta principiis.
4 3 1
If the Court must balance the fourth amendment liberties of
citizens, it must be ever-cognizant of the concerns of those who
framed this amendment. The framers were most concerned with
the evil associated with the general warrant and writ of assistance,
which was the official grant of unfettered discretion to search and
seize.43 2 The reasoning and result in Class disregards this vital con-
cern. The Court has opted for a formula that undermines personal
privacy in the name of effective law enforcement rather than a clear
statement of principle that prohibits all police intrusions absent ob-
jective cause. If James Otis were alive today, he surely would de-
nounce such a position as vehemently as he denounced the old writs
of assistance. These writs, claimed Otis, were "as the worst instance
of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty. . ... 433
431 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). A noted fourth amendment ex-
pert has recently urged the Court to reaffirm Justice Bradley's "stirring words." See
LaFave, supra note 23.
432 See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis"
Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 574-75 (1983)("The
colonists concentrated their fire on general warrants because they 'opposed leaving the
power to search and seize solely in executive hands' and because in their immediate past
experience uncontrolled executive discretion had taken this particular form.... [Tihe
colonists condemned writs of assistance because such writs 'no more controlled official
discretion than would a statute that simply permitted warrantless searches.' ") (footnotes
and citations omitted)(emphases in original). See also N. LASSON, supra note 414, at 51-
105; Stewart, supra note 301, at 1369-72.
433 N. Lasson, supra note 414, at 59.
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